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I. INTRODUCTION 
There was a time when the Supreme Court read the 
Constitution to require that all legislative powers vested in 
Congress would have to be exercised through the checks and 
balances of Articles I or II. Federal legislation would have to gain 
the support of both houses of Congress and survive presentment to 
the President.1 Treaties negotiated by the President would have to 
gain the approval of two-thirds of the Senate.2 To preserve the 
integrity of these checks and balances, neither Congress nor the 
President unilaterally could make law involving matters within 
Congress's exclusive legislative domain. Nor could Congress enact 
legislation authorizing the President, federal agencies, or the 
federal courts to exercise legislative powers outside the structural 
constraints of Articles I and II. The Constitution vested all 
legislative powers in Congress, and those powers could not be 
delegated. 3 
This "nondelegation doctrine" was not merely the product of 
arid formalist thinking. The judges who championed the doctrine 
did so, in large part, because they believed that unilateral federal 
lawmaking by a single branch would undermine republican values 
at the core of the Constitution's design. For republicans of the 
Founding Period, the purpose of government was to safeguard 
individual liberty from domination: the threat of arbitrary 
interference. Many of the Framers were steeped in classical 
republican theory, and they endeavored to establish public 
institutions and to enshrine public rights within a legal order that 
would safeguard republican liberty. The checks and balances of 
Articles I and II were carefully calibrated experiments in 
republican institutional design; by dispersing lawmaking powers 
I U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7. 
2 Jd. art. II, § 2. 
3 See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That congress cannot delegate 
legislative power to the president is a principle universally recognized as vital to the 
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution."); 
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 42 (1825) (rejecting the idea "that congress can 
delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively 
legislative"). 
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across multiple public institutions and relying on each branch to 
check the others' ambitions, the Framers sought to prevent any 
single branch from accumulating unchecked power to enact 
arbitrary laws. Thus, it was primarily respect for the 
Constitution's republican vision-and not simply formalism for 
formalism's sake-that inspired federal courts in the nineteenth 
century to articulate and defend a doctrine of legislative 
nondelegation. 
Whatever the nondelegation doctrine's merits may have been as 
a matter of constitutional theory, the doctrine lost its luster by the 
middle of the twentieth century. In case after case, the Court 
upheld statutes empowering the Executive Branch to make law 
subject only to the most nebulous of statutory standards. 
Administrative agencies therefore were permitted to fix "fair and 
equitable" prices for commodities, 4 set "just and reasonable" rates 
for natural gas, 5 and regulate broadcasting licenses as "public 
interest, convenience, or necessity" required. 6 Regulations 
promulgated pursuant to these broad statutory authorizations had 
the force of law, and many were backed by both civil and criminal 
penalties. 
In view of these developments, it is now widely accepted that 
Congress can, in fact, delegate lawmaking powers to the Executive 
and Judicial Branches. Administrative lawmaking is no longer 
interstitial (if it ever was), and it does not operate solely at the 
periphery of federal law. Rather, administrative lawmaking has 
become a central, defining feature of the modern administrative 
state in areas as diverse as financial regulation, environmental 
regulation, and occupational safety regulation. Although the 
Court has not formally abandoned the nondelegation doctrine, it 
has, in essence, bowed to the practical imperatives of modern 
congressional lawmaking, recognizing that "Congress simply 
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad 
general directives."7 
4 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944). 
5 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600-01 (1944). 
6 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 (1943). 
7 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
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For those who take seriously the republican ideals embodied in 
the Constitution, Congress's circumvention of legislative checks 
and balances should be cause for serious reflection. If 
"congressional delegation" enables unilateral lawmaking by the 
Executive Branch,8 this would seem to raise the very threat of 
domination that the Framers sought to address through the checks 
and balances of Articles I and II. Is the rise of the modern 
administrative state fundamentally inconsistent with our 
republican tradition, as some commentators have suggested?9 
This Article argues that congressional delegation of lawmaking 
powers can be reconciled with the Constitution's republican design 
but only if courts set aside the conventional wisdom that Articles I 
and II alone constrain congressional delegation. Instead, federal 
courts should safeguard the Constitution's republican values by 
embracing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-not 
Article I and II's checks and balances-as the primary constraint 
on congressional delegation. Under the "due process model" 
developed in this Article, Congress may enact legislation 
entrusting lawmaking authority to administrative agencies as long 
as it constrains administrative decisionmaking substantively, 
procedurally, and structurally in such a way that delegation does 
not engender domination by manifestly increasing the 
government's capacity for arbitrariness. Substantively, Congress 
must establish an "intelligible principle" to ensure that agency 
8 Whether Congress "delegates" its own legislative power when it enacts legislation 
authorizing executive lawmaking has been the subject of a lively debate. Compare Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 
1721 (2002) (rejecting the delegation position), with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna 
Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1297, 1298-99 (2003) (defending the nondelegation doctrine). Although this Article 
uses the term "congressional delegation" to capture congressional authorization of executive 
lawmaking, it does not intend to take a position on whether such authorizations should be 
conceptualized as a "delegation" of legislative power in a formalist sense. Rather, this 
Article's concern is with the practical consequences of delegation from a republican 
perspective: whether the authorization of executive lawmaking-delegated or not-
promotes domination by enhancing the federal government's capacity for arbitrariness. 
9 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (arguing that the legal system's validation of the administrative 
state "amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution"). 
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discretion is not entirely unbounded.10 But this is not all: due 
process also dictates that Congress must channel administrative 
lawmaking through procedural and structural constraints that are 
sufficiently robust to serve as functional substitutes for the checks 
and balances of Articles I and II. In short, Congress may 
authorize the other branches to make law unilaterally only if it 
establishes procedural and structural constraints that protect 
liberty. This focus on due process as the key constitutional 
safeguard limiting congressional delegation offers an attractive 
alternative to contemporary theories of the nondelegation doctrine 
because it honors the Constitution's republican ideals while 
translating the Constitution's republican structure for a world in 
which administrative regulation is widely accepted as an 
indispensible feature of American government. 11 
The principle that due process constrains congressional 
delegation is not widely appreciated today.12 Even before the 
nondelegation doctrine reached its zenith in the 1930s, however, 
the Court had carved out a role for procedural due process in 
delegation review by recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
limited state legislative delegations to municipalities.13 In a series 
of cases, the Court also invoked due process as a constraint on the 
10 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). 
11 Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1993) 
(arguing that fidelity to the Constitution's text may require different readings in different 
interpretive contexts over time). 
12 A few legal scholars have noted in passing that the nondelegation doctrine could be 
reframed as a due process doctrine, but this idea has remained underdeveloped. See Harold 
I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their 
Constitutionality, 16 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 208-10 (1989) (discussing the commingling 
of conceptions of the nondelegation doctrine and the Due Process Clause); Kate R. Bowers, 
Saying What the Law Isn't: Legislative Delegations of Waiver Authority in Environmental 
Laws, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 294 (2010) (discussing case law that supports a 
procedural due process approach to the nondelegation doctrine); Rebecca L. Brown, 
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1553-55 (1991) (discussing 
due process as it relates to standing and the origins of the nondelegation doctrine as a due 
process defense); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
713, 730 (1969) (suggesting an eventual coalescence of nondelegation and due process); 
Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations ofChenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 987 n.149 
(2007) (discussing due process concerns as an alternative to the nondelegation doctrine). 
13 See infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text. 
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substantive scope of federal legislative delegations, 14 and it 
intimated in leading nondelegation cases that administrative 
procedure and the availability of judicial review are relevant due 
process-centered considerations when evaluating the 
constitutionality of congressional delegations.15 In addition, the 
Court and lower federal courts suggested on a number of occasions 
that congressional delegations of lawmaking authority must be 
accompanied by procedural constraints such as requirements for 
reasoned deliberation and a public statement of the agency's 
rationale. 16 These aspects of the Court's jurisprudence have little to 
do with the nondelegation doctrine's formalist reading of ''legislative 
power." But they make sense if we embrace due process as the 
primary constitutional basis for the contemporary doctrine of 
constrained legislative delegation.17 As the nondelegation doctrine's 
formalist division of ''legislative" and "executive" power has eroded 
with the rise of the modern administrative state, the procedural and 
structural safeguards of due process have become increasingly 
salient as the primary constitutional constraints on congressional 
delegation of lawmaking authority. 
One important implication of this emerging due process model 
is that many of the administrative procedures outlined in the 
federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)1S take on a 
constitutional dimension. This Article is not the first, of course, to 
suggest that APA procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking 
promote constitutional values such as public accountability, 
rationality, transparency, and non-arbitrariness. 19 What this 
14 See infra Part IV.A (discussing substantive due process). 
15 See infra Part IV.B-C (discussing procedural and structural due process). 
1s See infra Part IV.B-C. 
17 Although the due process model helps to explain the contours of the contemporary 
nondelegation doctrine, it does not require courts to deny that administrative agencies 
perform legislative functions in practice. This Article therefore prefers to characterize the 
due process model as a theory of constitutional constraint, not a theory of nondelegation 
per se. 
18 See generally Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S. C. §§ 551-559 (2000). 
19 See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 53 (1994) 
(describing the APA as "a quasi-constitutional statute" and suggesting that "[i]f there were 
no APA, the courts ... would certainly have invented something like it in order to 
implement the constitutional safeguards of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause"); 
HeinOnline  -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 124 2011-2012
124 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:117 
Article does contribute, however, is a richer normative account of 
precisely why and how the AP A supports our constitutional system 
of ordered liberty. In particular, this Article argues that where 
Congress delegates lawmaking authority to the other branches, it 
must channel that authority through liberty-promoting procedures 
that are functionally comparable to the checks and balances of 
Articles I and II. Congress may satisfy this standard by 
prescribing an intelligible principle to guide agency discretion, 
coupled with APA-style deliberative administrative procedures 
that are backed by political accountability and judicial review. 
Where such substantive, procedural, and structural safeguards are 
in place, agency lawmaking does not manifestly increase the 
federal government's capacity for arbitrariness and, therefore, 
honors the Constitution's republican design. 
In the discussion that follows, this Article develops a due 
process model of congressional delegation in four steps. Part II 
explains how federal and state courts developed the nondelegation 
doctrine during the nineteenth century to address concerns that 
congressional delegation would undermine individual liberty. Part 
III examines the nondelegation doctrine's decline during the 
twentieth century and explains why recent efforts to revitalize the 
nondelegation doctrine through canons of statutory interpretation 
fail to safeguard the Constitution's republican ideals. Part IV 
develops the Article's core thesis that due process offers a superior 
framework for advancing individual liberty. As courts have 
recognized in a variety of settings, due process addresses the 
threat of arbitrary agency lawmaking by imposing substantive, 
procedural, and structural constraints on Congress's delegation of 
lawmaking functions to federal agencies. To illustrate the due 
process model's practical applications, Part V briefly considers 
several areas in which the due process model could prompt a 
reconsideration of contemporary administrative law. These areas 
Gillian Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 479, 484 (2010) (arguing that the APA's provisions addressing accountability-type 
concerns constitute "constitutional common law''); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in 
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) (drawing parallels between the 
Constitution's republican structure and administrative procedure). 
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include judicial statutory interpretation, agency self-regulation, 
congressional delegation to the President, congressional delegation 
of foreign affairs powers, and delegations of federal lawmaking 
power to states, tribes, private entities, and international 
organizations. 
II. THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF NONDELEGATION 
When courts and legal scholars retrace the nondelegation 
doctrine's intellectual history, the conventional starting point is 
John Locke's social-contract theory. According to Locke, all public 
officials and institutions exercise power delegated from the people 
and are therefore bound by the common-law maxim that a 
delegated power cannot be delegated--delegata potestas non potest 
delegari. 20 One implication of this theory is that Congress cannot 
delegate lawmaking authority to administrative agencies because 
such delegation would breach the social contract upon which 
Congress's own authority depends. This Lockean account of 
nondelegation appears in many judicial decisions21 and has become 
a recurring trope in scholarly commentary.22 Nonetheless, it 
represents a shallow and, in some respects, misleading account of 
the doctrine's theoretical origins. 
This Part develops Professor Rebecca Brown's insight that the 
nondelegation doctrine should be viewed primarily as an 
expressiOn of the Founding Generation's commitment to 
20 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CML GOVERNMENT 79, 'If 141 (1986) (1690); 
see also SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER 11 (1975) (describing the nondelegation doctrine as "an import into constitutional 
law from the common law of agency where an ancient maxim prohibits the redelegation of 
delegated power"); Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Poteat 
Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 174 (1928) 
(describing early nondelegation doctrine cases as based, in part, on the idea that the people 
delegated legislative power to Congress as a nondelegable "mandate or trust''). 
2I See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1928) 
(noting that the maxim is "well understood"). 
22 See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 8, at 1297 (tracing the nondelegation 
doctrine to Locke's THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT); Cynthia R. Farina, 
Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL 'y 87, 90-95 (2010) (discussing a 
Lockean view on nondelegation); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 729 (linking the 
delegation doctrine metaphor to Lockean theory). 
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republican liberty.23 The republican tradition posits that the 
purpose of public institutions and public law is to safeguard 
individuals against tyranny, defined as subjection to another's 
arbitrary will.24 While other scholars have noted the influence of 
classical republican political theory in separation of powers 
jurisprudence, 25 the nondelegation doctrine has received only 
sporadic consideration as an expression of republican political 
theory.26 As this Part demonstrates, however, republicanism 
offers a compelling explanation for the nondelegation doctrine's 
genesis in the mid-nineteenth century and its evolution during the 
early twentieth century.27 
A. LIBERTY AS NONDOMINATION 
Republicanism asserts that all governments bear a basic 
obligation to advance the good of their people as a whole--res 
publica-rather than their own self-interest or the factional 
interests of particular groups or individuals. 28 Despite differences 
23 See Brown, supra note 12, at 1553-55. 
24 See infra Part II.A. 
26 See generally THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL 
VISION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LoCKE (1988) (referencing 
such influence throughout); M.N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY 
IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1994) (same); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 177~ 1787 (1969) (same). 
26 See BARBER, supra note 20, at 11-12, 2~30 (rejecting the republican tradition as both 
descriptively and normatively inadequate to explain the nondelegation doctrine). A number 
of scholars have characterized the nondelegation doctrine as a bulwark against 
arbitrariness. See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 208 (2d ed. 
1978) (stating that the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to "protect private parties 
against injustice on account of unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power''); Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 , 51~19, 523-25 (2003) (arguing that the 
Court's application of the nondelegation doctrine is best understood. in terms of preventing 
arbitrariness); Stack, supra note 12, at 99~98 (''The nondelegation doctrine aims to protect 
against arbitrary agency decision-making, and to promote regularity, rationality, and 
transparency.'). 
27 This Article does not claim that republicanism was universally accepted during the 
Founding Period or that it offers the only plausible account of separation of powers, but only 
that it represents a historically grounded and normatively attractive theory that best 
explains the rise of the nondelegation doctrine. 
28 M.N.S. SELLERS, REPUBLICAN LEGAL THEORY: THE HISTORY, CONSTITUTION AND 
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in emphasis, all republicans share a commitment to individual 
liberty as freedom from tyranny.29 Tyranny in this context is 
synonymous with domination, the condition of being subject to 
another's arbitrary will.ao 
In the republican tradition, liberty is constituted only in and 
through institutions because individuals are unable as a practical 
matter to enjoy independence from the threat of arbitrary 
interference without collective organization.31 The purpose oflegal 
and political institutions, from this perspective, is to safeguard 
individuals from the arbitrary control of others-dominium.32 
Republicans also recognize, however, that the state itself may 
undermine liberty to the extent that it possesses the capacity to 
PURPOSES OF LAW IN A FREE STATE 16 (2003). 
29 See, e.g., ISEULT HONOHAN, CIVIC REPUBIJCANISM 18~4 (2002) (discussing three 
different republican conceptions of freedom, including "[f]reedom as non-domination"); 
PHIIJP PE'ITIT, REPUBIJCANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 80 (1997) 
(stating that the republican traditions "cast freedom as non-domination in the role of 
supreme political value"); SELLERS, supra note 28, at 27 (''Republican liberty requires that 
no person be governed by any other person's simple will or passion."); Samantha Besson & 
Jose Luis Marti, Law and Republicanism: Mapping the Issues, in LEGAL REPUBIJCANISM: 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 13 (Samantha Besson & Jose Luis Marti 
eds., 2009) ("According to the majority view, the idea of liberty is the central value in 
republican political tradition."). 
30 See PETTIT, supra note 29, at 52 (defining domination as "a power of interference on an 
arbitrary basis"). Some republicans argue further that public participation in governance is 
constitutive of individual liberty. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: 
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PuBIJC PHILOSOPHY 5 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996) (arguing that 
participating in government promotes individual liberty by providing a means for 
individuals "to pursue their ends"); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 
1495 (1988) (contending that the republican tradition enhances freedom by encouraging the 
revision of normative histories that provide value and self-direction to individuals); Cass B. 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1551 (1988) (stating that 
individual rights are understood "as either the preconditions for or the outcome of' 
republican deliberation). This Article focuses primarily on the neo-Roman conception of 
freedom as nondomination, which is associated with Pettit and Skinner, while recognizing 
that greater public participation in government might be normatively desirable. Cf. Evan J. 
Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency 
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 476 (2010) (arguing that the state must afford citizens 
opportunities to participate in public governance but suggesting that the public's voluntary 
disengagement from politics does not ipso facto delegitimize public administration). 
31 See PE'ITIT, supra note 29, at lOG-01. 
32 See id.; Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of 
Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1430 (2008) (arguing that "freedom can only exist under a 
system of law"). 
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wield public power arbitrarily-imperium.33 Hence, the state's 
assumption of public powers can be understood to advance the 
cause of liberty only to the extent that the law requires the state to 
exercise its coercive powers nonarbitrarily in the interest of its 
people. Law safeguards liberty by immunizing individuals from 
the threat of arbitrary interference, whether this threat emanates 
from the state itself or from other private parties. 34 This 
institutional and legal constitution of individual liberty is, for 
republicans, the essence of the rule of law.35 
The republican conception of liberty has attracted renewed 
interest in recent years with the publication of Professor Philip 
Pettit's magisterial Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government. 36 Pettit's primary contribution to the republican 
tradition 1s his clarification of the distinction between 
republicanism's conception of liberty as freedom from domination 
and mainstream liberalism's view of liberty as freedom from 
interference.37 As Pettit observes, liberals tend to assume that 
individuals experience a loss of liberty only when others 
affirmatively interfere with their interests.3B In contrast, 
republicans view another's mere "capacity to interfere" as a state 
of domination-regardless of whether that capacity is exercised. 39 
Invoking the classic republican trope of the master-slave 
relationship, Pettit observes that a benevolent master could grant 
a slave a measure of independence by voluntarily refraining from 
interfering with the slave's interests.40 Nonetheless, for 
republicans the slave of such a benevolent master would not enjoy 
liberty in a meaningful sense because the master would continue 
to possess the legal capacity to dispose of the slave's interests as 
33 PE'ITIT, supra note 29, at 174; Dawood, supra note 32, at 1430. 
34 PE'ITIT, supra note 29, at 36. 
35 See id. ; ISEULT HONOHAN, CMC REPUBLICANISM 184 (Tim Crane & Jonathan Wolff 
eds., 2002). 
36 PETTIT, supra note 29. 
37 Id. at 45-50. 
38 Id. at 8-9. 
39 Id. at 52, 54-55 (emphasis added). 
40 Id. at 22-23. 
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the master sees fit. 41 As long as the slave remains subject to the 
master's alien control, the slave does not enjoy liberty.42 
This conception of liberty had particular resonance for 
American revolutionaries, who viewed British colonial rule as 
intolerable tyranny precisely because it institutionalized 
domination. The practice of "taxation without representation" 
epitomized the tyrannical condition of colonial rule because it 
demonstrated that the American people "lived at the mercy of an 
alien and potentially arbitrary will: the will of the British 
Parliament. Here, as the votaries of the tradition saw it, were a 
people in the chains of slavery, a people unfree."43 
Conversely to liberalism, republicanism recognizes that a 
person may experience governmental interference without 
suffering domination.44 A State does not dominate its 
constituents, for instance, when it imposes proportional civil or 
criminal sanctions to enforce regulatory laws that are reasonably 
calculated to advance compelling public interests (e.g., traffic 
safety, product safety). Such sanctions undoubtedly constitute 
state interference in the private sphere, but they do not undermine 
liberty in the republican sense because they do not place any 
private party in the position of "relating to anyone in the fashion of 
slave or subject."45 Indeed, reasonable regulatory laws advance 
the cause of liberty by immunizing all individuals, including those 
sanctioned, from having their interests subject to the arbitrary 
control of other~.g., reckless drivers, unscrupulous 
manufacturers. Republicanism thus offers a theoretical framework 
congenial to Blackstone's assertion "that laws, when prudently 
framed, are by no means subversive, but rather introductive of 
liberty."46 
Far from treating individuals as servants or subjects of the 
State, republicans view the State as the people's fiduciary for the 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 33. 
44 Id. at 23. 
45 Id. 
46 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 126 (London, 
Taylor 1830) (1765). 
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purpose of establishing ordered liberty. "The commonwealth or 
republican position," observes Pettit, "sees the people as trustor, 
both individually and collectively, and sees the state as trustee: in 
particular, it sees the people as trusting the state to ensure a 
dispensation of non-arbitrary rule."47 Professor Gordon Wood, the 
leading historian of early American republicanism, has observed 
that a State's fiduciary obligation to safeguard its people from 
domination "summed up constitutionally what republicanism 
meant to Americans in 1776."48 American republicans during the 
Founding Period thus aspired not only to cast off the shackles of 
colonial rule but also to lay the groundwork for a republican 
system of government-{)ne capable of institutionalizing ordered 
liberty through democracy and the rule of law. 
B. LIBERTY IN CHECKS AND BALANCES 
The effort to construct a republic on American soil presented 
challenging questions of constitutional design. The Framers 
scoured classical sources in search of models, with John Adams's A 
Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of 
America49 serving as a particularly influential guide.50 Although 
republicans envisioned a republican government as the champion 
of liberty,51 they also were acutely aware that previous republics 
ultimately had failed in this pursuit, collapsing into "turbulence, 
violence, and abuse of power."52 Writing under the pseudonym 
Publius, a leading founder of the Roman republic, the authors of 
47 PETI'IT, supra note 29, at 8. 
48 WOOD, supra note 25, at 150. For an argument that U.S. administrative law generally 
reflects a fiduciary model of delegation and discretion, see generally Evan J . Criddle, 
Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006). 
49 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (1787). 
60 See SELLERS, supra note 25, at 33 ("John Adams's Defense of the Constitutions of the 
United States of America [sic] provided Americans with their most comprehensive 
contemporary commentary and source book for republican institutions and attitudes."). 
61 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 544 (''The friends of the Constitution are as tenacious of 
liberty as its enemies .... They wish to give the government powers to secure and protect 
it." (quoting John Marshall) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
62 Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507, 513 (1847) (quoting James Madison's statement 
during the Virginia ratification debates) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The Federalist presented American constitutionalism as an effort 
to take up the fallen banner of classical republicanism, restoring 
the ideal of liberty as nondomination while correcting the Romans' 
errors in institutional design and thereby avoiding the "vices" of 
their predecessors. 53 
For American republicans, constitutionalism demanded a 
government with maximal capacity to promote the common good 
but minimal capacity to exercise public powers arbitrarily.54 The 
Framers drew inspiration from Montesquieu's proposal in The 
Spirit of the Laws to safeguard liberty by dividing governmental 
powers structurally into co-equal legislative, executive, and 
judicial departments. 55 Like Montesquieu, American republicans 
viewed the union of powers in any single government department 
as "the very definition of tyranny."56 By vesting the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers respectively in three distinct 
branches of government, the Framers sought to limit the capacity 
of any single branch to exercise unilateral, arbitrary power. 57 
Having thus divided power among the three branches, the 
Framers also built robust checks and balances into the legislative 
process to curtail Congress's capacity for arbitrary lawmaking. 
Fearing the potential for a powerful legislature to overwhelm the 
other branches and defeat liberty, James Madison departed from 
Montesquieu's vision of neatly separated powers, concluding that 
liberty did not require the three branches to "have no partial 
53 THE FEDERALIST No.9, at 71-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see 
also PANGLE, supra note 25, at 43 (quoting various Framers who acknowledged the failure 
of ancient republics and expressed their intention to realize classical ideals). 
54 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 53, at 80 (arguing that 
the goal of the republican model of government embodied in the Constitution is "[t]o secure 
the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same 
time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government"). 
55 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 
(Thomas Nugent trans. 1949). 
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 53, at 301. 
57 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40 (1957) ("Ours is a government of divided authority on 
the assumption that in division there is not only strength but freedom from tyranny."); M. 
Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 
1148 (2000) ("[C]ourts and commentators agree on the following objective: The system of 
separation of powers is intended to prevent a single governmental institution from 
possessing and exercising too much power."). 
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agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other."58 To the 
contrary, Madison recognized that a unitary legislative body 
vested with unencumbered, unilateral lawmaking power would 
pose an especially grave threat to liberty because it could facilitate 
the tyranny of majority rule.59 That a representative legislature 
might, in practice, endeavor to serve the common good did not 
adequately address republican concerns because an unchecked 
legislative body still would have the capacity for arbitrary 
regulation. Thus, the Constitution ultimately provided not only 
for the election of federal legislators as popular representatives, 
but also for legislative bicameralism60 and presentment of 
legislation to the President for approval or veto.61 By placing 
multiple representative institutions as gatekeepers within the 
legislative process, the Constitution sought to minimize the federal 
government's capacity to enact tyrannical laws that would 
arbitrarily favor one factional interest over another.62 
Comparable checks and balances appear in the treaty-making 
provisions of Article II. The Treaty Clause divides treaty-making 
power between the Executive and Legislative Branches: the 
President negotiates and signs treaties for the United States with 
the advice and consent of the Senate; but the Senate, by 
supermajority vote, serves as the final arbiter of treaty 
58 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 53, at 302. 
59 Id. at 301; see also Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. 479, 487 (1847) (observing that "our republican 
government was instituted" on a foundation of "separate, co-ordinate branches ... to 
operate as balances, checks and restraints, not only upon each other, but upon the people 
themselves; to guard them against their own rashness, precipitancy, and misguided zeal; 
and to protect the minority against the injustice of the majority''); Parker v. 
Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507, 512 (1847) (describing the Constitution's checks and balances as 
addressing two concerns: "the attacks of popular delusion and error from without" and 
"faithlessness and corruption from within"); WOOD, supra note 25, at 452 ("An elective 
despotism was not the government we fought for." (quoting Thomas Jefferson) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
eo U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
et Id. art. I, § 7. 
62 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 53, at 80-84 (demonstrating 
how the structure of a republican form of government protects against factual rules); see 
also THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 53, at 72-73 (describing 
legislative checks and balances as "means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of 
republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided"). 
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ratification.63 Thus, although the President takes a leading role in 
the preparation of treaties, the Constitution ensures that Article II 
treaties, like federal legislation, become "supreme Law of the 
Land" only through a process that prevents any single branch from 
exercising unchecked lawmaking power.64 
Founding-era republicans viewed these structural features of 
Articles I and II as devices for promoting collective deliberation 
about the common good.65 In theory, legislative checks and 
balances would promote transparency and force the House, the 
Senate, and the President to deliberate over the means and ends of 
public policy, minimizing the potential for any particular 
institution to hijack the legislative process in pursuit of factional 
objectives. Where consensus about the common good could not be 
reached, the same checks and balances would compel legislators to 
negotiate together toward a mutually acceptable compromise.66 In 
theory, the Senate's role in the treaty-ratification process likewise 
would tend to expose international agreements to enhanced public 
scrutiny and debate, as well as to stimulate greater inter-branch 
deliberation and negotiation. Republicans saw these checks and 
balances as useful devices for decreasing the federal government's 
capacity for arbitrary lawmaking. While these safeguards might 
not assure that Congress would never be "arbitrary in the 
substantive sense of actually going against the interests or 
judgements of the persons affected," they would offer a meaningful 
check against arbitrariness in the procedural sense of denying any 
single governmental institution the "power of interfering on an 
arbitrary, unchecked basis."67 
63 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
64 See id. art. VI (''This constitution, and the laws of the United States shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made . .. shall be the Supreme Law of the Land."). This 
is not to suggest, of course, that the bicameral legislative process and Treaty Clause are 
interchangeable or that either one fully realizes the republican ideal. 
65 See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 1561, 1569 (noting that the structure of the checks and 
balances system in general promotes government discussions). 
66 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 
1673, 1674 (1988) (arguing that the Framers' "plan was to hope for republicanism but to 
gird the republic for an onslaught of pluralism"). 
67 PETIIT, supra note 29, at 55. 
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Although the Constitution's Framers aspired to institutionalize 
liberty, they recognized that Articles I and II were not a perfect 
prophylaxis against legislative domination. The republican 
conception of liberty as nondomination is best understood as an 
ideal to be pursued, as opposed to one that can be fully realized in 
a Congress constructed from the "crooked timber" of human 
legislators.68 Even the most finely engineered constitutional 
checks and balances and political accountability mechanisms 
cannot ensure that legislators will always enact laws in the public 
interest. As such, a legislature's capacity for arbitrariness always 
will be a matter of degree.69 Nonetheless, while the Framers 
recognized that constitutional checks and balances might not be 
sufficient to fully realize the ideal of republican liberty, they 
anticipated that these structures would significantly reduce 
Congress's capacity for arbitrariness by spurring congressional 
deliberation, contestation, and reason-giving.70 Having laid a 
basic structural foundation for republican legislation, the Framers 
would have to await subsequent contributions-including the Bill 
of Rights, 71 the Reconstruction Amendments, 72 the AP A, 73 the Civil 
Rights Act,74 and the Voting Rights Act75-to more fully realize the 
republican ideal of ordered liberty. 
68 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 170 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1969) (paraphrasing Immanuel Kant). 
69 See PETTIT, supra note 29, at 58 ("[A] dominating agent may be able to interfere on a 
more or less arbitrary basis, with greater or lesser ease, and in a more or less severe 
measure."). 
1o See Dawood, supra note 32, at 1419 n.31 (noting that relations of power organized to 
minimize duration); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's 
Theorem, Article I and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 
DUKE L.J. 948, 949 (observing that the Framers designed Article I to promote 
"circumspection in lawmaking''). 
71 U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X. 
72 Id. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. 
73 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-559 (2000). 
74 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
75 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973aa-6 (2006). 
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C. LIBERTY AND NONDELEGATION 
Given the republican ideals embodied in the Constitution's 
legislative checks and balances, it should perhaps come as no 
surprise that some federal courts in the nineteenth century took a 
dim view of the idea that Congress might circumvent those 
constraints via delegation. The problem was not simply that 
congressional delegation of legislative power would transgress the 
common law presumption against subdelegation.76 Rather, the 
problem was that the Constitution deliberately channeled federal 
lawmaking powers through well-defined procedures-e.g., 
bicameralism, presentment-to safeguard individual liberty. If 
Congress could authorize the Executive Branch to make law 
unilaterally, this would circumvent the Constitution's liberty-
enhancing checks and balances and increase the federal 
government's capacity for arbitrary lawmaking. The product of 
this line of reasoning was the "nondelegation doctrine": Congress 
could not entrust its constitutionally vested lawmaking functions 
to the Executive and Judicial Branches. 
During the nineteenth century, federal and state courts 
endorsed the nondelegation doctrine as an essential corollary of 
the structural Constitution.77 State supreme courts connected 
nondelegation principles to constitutional "checks and balances," 
explaining that nondelegation review was essential to preserve the 
legislative process against "the attacks of popular delusion and 
error from without" and "faithlessness and corruption from 
76 Even in private law, it was widely understood that the presumption against 
subdelegation could be overcome by evidence "growing out of the particular transaction, or 
of the usage of trade, [that] a broader power was intended to be conferred on the agent." 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY§ 14, at 15 (8th ed. 1874). 
77 See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) ("[l]n 
carrying out that constitutional division into three branches it is a breach of the national 
fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, 
or to the Judicial Branch."); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That congress cannot 
delegate legislative power to the president is a principle universally recognized as vital to 
the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution."); 
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 42-43 (1825) ("It will not be contended that 
Congress can delegate to the Courts ... powers which are strictly and exclusively 
legislative."). 
HeinOnline  -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 136 2011-2012
136 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:117 
within."78 The Court relied on this state court jurisprudence in 
developing its own nondelegation jurisprudence in the later 
decades of the nineteenth century. For example, in Field v. Clark, 
the Court characterized the nondelegability of legislative power as 
"a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and 
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the 
[C]onstitution."79 Three decades later, the Court in J. W. Hampton, 
Jr., & Co. v. United States stressed that it would be "a breach of 
the national fundamental law" for Congress to authorize either the 
President or the federal judiciary to perform its constitutional 
lawmaking function.so Although the Court in these cases did not 
expressly discuss legislative checks and balances, its effort to 
distinguish between legislative and executive powers can be seen 
as an attempt to preserve the Constitution's republican structure 
and thereby conserve liberty. 
As the nondelegation doctrine took shape over the course of the 
nineteenth century, the Court introduced two significant 
clarifications regarding the doctrine's scope. First, the Court 
reasoned that the Constitution did not preclude Congress from 
authorizing the Executive Branch to exercise broad discretionary 
powers as long as Congress conditioned those powers upon discrete 
findings of fact. For example, the Court upheld a federal statute 
authorizing the President to suspend the United States' embargo 
of France and Great Britain if the President determined that those 
countries had "cease[d] to violate the neutral commerce of the 
United States."81 The next year, the Court decided a pair of cases 
in which it approved similar statutes permitting the President to 
78 Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507, 515 (1847); see also Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. 479, 485 
(1847) (connecting nondelegation to republican principles and emphasizing that a 
legislative "act is void, if it palpably violates the principles and spirit of the constitution, or 
tends to subvert our republican form of government"); Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville 
R.R. Co. v. Comm'rs of Clinton Cnty. (Railroad Co.), 1 Ohio St. 77, 87 (1852) (reasoning that 
congressional delegation would "subvert" constitutional checks and balances, which serve 
"no less for the protection and safety of the minority, than the majority"). 
79 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (citing, inter alia, Railroad Co.). 
80 276 u.s. 394, 406 (1928). 
Sl The Cargo of the Brig Aurora, Burn Side v. United States (The Brig Aurora), 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 382, 383 (1813). 
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grant, annul, or revoke the commissions of privateers82 and to 
grant passports of safe passage to British ships.83 The Court relied 
upon the reasoning of these early decisions decades later when it 
held that Congress could authorize the President to suspend 
provisions of an 1890 tariff act upon determining that foreign 
governments had introduced commodities into U.S. markets on a 
"reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" basis.84 The Court 
reasoned that this allowance did not entrust "the power of 
legislation" to the President because "Congress itself [had] 
prescribed, in advance," the discrete circumstances that would 
merit suspension, as well as "the duties to be levied, collected, and 
paid ... while the suspension lasted."85 Within this regulatory 
scheme, the President "was the mere agent of the law-making 
department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its 
expressed will was to take effect."86 Thus, the Court reasoned that 
Congress could authorize the Executive Branch to wield broad 
discretionary powers as long as Congress first discharged its 
constitutional legislative responsibility to specify the circumstances 
that would trigger executive action. 
Second, the Court held that administrative regulations would 
not unconstitutionally invade legislative powers as long as 
Congress had established a general statutory standard to guide 
the agency's actions.87 Indeed, "[i]f Congress shall lay down by 
82 The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 421, 421 (1814). 
83 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 115 (1814). 
84 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892). 
85 Id. at 692-93. 
86 Id. at 693. The dissent argued that the law entrusted too much discretionary power to 
the President and that it unconstitutionally delegated both legislative power under Article I 
and treaty-making power under Article II. Id. at 697 (Lamar, J., dissenting). 
87 See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) ("[I]t ... becomes 
constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public 
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegatory authority."); Opp Cotton 
Mills, Inc. v. Adm'r, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941) (holding that if Congress has laid out the 
standards and procedures by which the agency is to act, "there is no failure of performance 
of the legislative function'); Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 
(1922) ("In creating such an administrative agency the Legislature, to prevent its being a 
pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and 
certain rules of decision in the performance of its function."); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 
U.S. 470, 496 (1904) (holding that the delegation was constitutional because "Congress 
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legislative act an intelligible principle to which the [delegate] is 
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden 
delegation of legislative power."88 In theory, the requirement that 
Congress enact an "intelligible principle" to guide executive 
discretion would ensure "that important choices of social policy are 
made by Congress" rather than administrative agencies.89 As long 
as Congress determined major questions of legislative policy, the 
theory held, administrative agencies could flesh out the technical 
details and applications of Congress's framework through 
administrative regulation. 90 
The nondelegation doctrine reached its high-water mark in 
1935 when the Court invoked the doctrine in two high-profile cases 
as a basis for striking down provisions of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA).91 The first case, Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan,92 addressed a provision of the NIRA that authorized the 
President "to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign 
commerce" of so-called ''hot oil" -petroleum and petroleum 
products produced in violation of state law.93 The Court concluded 
that the President's discretion was not adequately constrained 
because Congress did not "require any finding by the President as 
a condition of his action."94 Turning to the intelligible principle 
requirement, the Court lamented that "Congress left the matter to 
the President without standard or rule, to be dealt with as he 
pleased."95 That the President may have acted "for what he 
believes to be the public good" was no response, the Court 
observed, because the question was "not one of motives but of 
legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable"). 
88 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
89 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring). 
90 See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1911) (distinguishing ''legislative 
power" from "administrative authority'' and stating that "it [is] impracticable for Congress 
to provide general regulations for these various and varying details of management"). 
91 National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 (NIRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 701-728 
(Supp. 1933). 
92 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
93 Id. at 406. 
94 Id. at 415. 
9s Id. at 418. 
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constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is not a 
substitute."96 To permit the President to operate without proper 
congressional direction would render obsolete "the constitutional 
processes of legislation which are an essential part of our system of 
government."97 In other words, absent statutory standards forged 
in the Article !-prescribed legislative process, even the best-
intentioned presidential lawmaking would reflect domination. 
Similar concerns about unconstrained executive discretion 
arose in the second NIRA-based case, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States.98 Here, Congress's entrustment of 
regulatory power to the President was far broader than that 
considered in Panama Refining: the Act vested the President with 
authority to promulgate "codes of fair competition" for "unfair 
competitive practices" in any industries the President chose to 
regulate.99 The President's authority could not be construed as 
mere fact-finding because Congress did not supply "rules of 
conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by 
appropriate administrative procedure."100 Moreover, Congress 
failed to establish any "standards, aside from the statement of [the 
NIRA's] general aims of rehabilitation, correction, and 
expansion."101 Because in these circumstances "the discretion of 
the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting 
laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the 
country [was] virtually unfettered," the Court invalidated the 
provision as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.102 
Even Justice Cardozo, who cast the lone dissenting vote in 
Panama Refining, concurred that the lawmaking power entrusted 
to executive control in Schechter Poultry was "not canalized within 
banks that keep it from overflowing'' but was "unconfined and 
vagrant."103 This, he agreed, was "delegation running riot."l04 
96 ld. at 420. 
97 Jd. at 430. 
98 295 u.s. 495, 537-39 (1935). 
99 Jd. at 534-35 (quoting the NIRA statute) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10o !d. at 541. 
101 ld. 
102 ld. at 542. 
103 ld. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
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Although some legal scholars have suggested that the 
nondelegation doctrine aims to ensure lawmaking by politically 
accountable public officials, 105 the better view is that it aims to 
conserve liberty through checks and balances.106 As Professor Lisa 
Bressman has observed, if the nondelegation doctrine's raison 
d'etre was merely to ensure politically accountable lawmaking, the 
Court's holdings in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry would 
be unsustainable because they invalidate delegations to the 
politically accountable President.107 
These features of the nondelegation doctrine make sense, 
however, if we view the doctrine instead through a republican lens. 
On the republican account, delegations of uncanalized lawmaking 
power to the unilateral discretion of a single politically 
accountable branch are unacceptable because they increase the 
federal government's capacity for arbitrary lawmaking. While 
political accountability represents an important constitutional 
check against the abuse of public powers, it is not a sufficient 
substitute for legislative checks and balances, which are already 
predicated upon the political accountability of Congress and the 
Executive Branch. The nondelegation doctrine thus prohibits 
transfers of lawmaking power to all executive officials (including 
the popularly elected President and Vice President) outside the 
Constitution's checks and balances, not just to appointed and 
career bureaucrats within administrative agencies. 108 
104 Id. at 553. 
105 See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 9-11 (1993) (arguing that delegation allows 
legislatures to avoid blame for the burdens that regulatory statutes impose) . 
106 See 1 DAVIS, supra note 26, at 208 (''The purpose [of the nondelegation doctrine] should 
be to protect private parties against injustice on account of unnecessary and uncontrolled 
discretionary power."); Bressman, supra note 26, at 499-500 (arguing that constitutional 
lawmaking requirements prevent concentration of power in any one branch to avoid "the 
tyranny of any one branch"). 
107 Bressman, supra note 26, at 525. 
108 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448--49 (1998) (declaring the line 
item veto an unconstitutional delegation of power from Congress to the President). 
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D. NONDELEGATION AND INDEPENDENT LAWMAKING POWERS 
In contexts where the Constitution vests independent 
lawmaking power in the Executive and Judicial Branches, the 
nondelegation doctrine poses no obstacle to congressional 
delegation. For example, in Wayman v. Southard, the Court 
recognized that Congress could authorize federal courts to develop 
rules of judicial procedure-a power courts arguably possessed 
independently under the Constitution.109 Likewise, the Court has 
held that Congress may commit broad lawmaking authority to the 
Executive Branch in fields such as military discipline-where the 
President possesses independent constitutional authority.110 
Although the Constitution permits Congress to deve~op statutory 
standards to constrain the other branches' discretion in these 
fields, the nondelegation doctrine does not affirmatively require 
Congress to do so; the doctrine simply does not apply if the other 
branches could perform the same activity without congressional 
authorization.u1 
This feature of the nondelegation doctrine reflects the limits of 
the Constitution's republican design. Where the President and the 
courts enjoy independent lawmaking powers, for example, 
uncanalized statutory delegations merely preserve the 
constitutional status quo; they do not introduce new forms of 
domination. Conversely, in contexts where Congress entrusts 
lawmaking authority to the other branches that they do not 
already possess independently, its delegations may undermine 
liberty by increasing the federal government's capacity for 
arbitrariness. The nondelegation doctrine's republican foundations 
1o9 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 44-45 (1825). 
no See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (holding that Congress could 
authorize the President to prescribe "aggravating factors" for capital punishment in court-
martial cases); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From 
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2137-38 (2004) (arguing 
that the President may exercise independent lawmaking powers over the management of 
federal lands because Article I does not vest this power exclusively in Congress). 
m See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ &-19, at 981 (3d ed. 
2000) (''Where a power is not clearly conferred on Congress alone, courts may construe that 
power as delegable."). 
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are thus evident not only in the many fields where the doctrine 
applies, but also implicitly in the limited contexts where it does not. 
Ill. FROM NONDELEGATION TO DELEGATION 
By drawing a formal distinction between legislative and 
executive powers, federal courts for a time enforced a strong 
nondelegation doctrine and sought to channel all significant 
federal lawmaking through the checks and balances of Articles I 
and II. Since the 1930s, however, the Court has not invalidated a 
single federal statute on nondelegation grounds. Although the 
Court has not formally abandoned the nondelegation doctrine, 112 it 
has upheld many sweeping delegations of lawmaking authority to 
administrative agencies. 113 As a result, the conventional wisdom 
among administrative law scholars today is that the nondelegation 
doctrine is, for all practical purposes, "a dead letter."114 Delegation 
reigns. The question is whether congressional delegation of broad 
lawmaking powers can be squared with the Constitution's liberty-
promoting checks and balances. 
112 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (affirming that 
Article I , Section 1 "permits no delegation of [legislative] powers"). 
113 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (upholding complete 
delegation of power to determine federal sentencing guidelines to the sentencing 
commission); Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600--01 
(1944) (upholding delegation of power to Commission to determine the just and reasonable 
rate of natural gas even though Congress "provided no formula" for determining what rates 
met that standard); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423 (1944) (upholding delegation 
of power to fix prices under the Emergency Price Control Act); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 (1943) (upholding the broad regulatory power of the Federal 
Communications Commission). 
114 Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 329 (2002); see 
also Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 
1, 25 (1982) (explaining that the nondelegation doctrine has evolved into a diluted form); 
Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 710-11 (1994) 
(reviewing DAVID SCHOENBRAD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)) (noting that a 
judicially enforced nondelegation doctrine is dead). 
HeinOnline  -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 143 2011-2012
2011] WHEN DELEGATION BEGETS DOMINATION 143 
A. THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
Mter striking down significant proVIsions of the NIRA in 
Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry,115 the Court soon lost its 
appetite for nondelegation review. In Yakus v. United States, 116 
the Court upheld a federal statute that directed the President to 
prevent wartime inflation by setting prices, wages, and salaries at 
"fair and equitable" levels "so far as practicable."117 Brushing 
aside the objection that Congress must prescribe more restrictive 
standards to guide presidential lawmaking, the Court declared 
that federal legislation would raise constitutional concerns only in 
the complete "absence of standards" such that "it would be 
impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of 
Congress has been obeyed."U8 This laissez-faire approach to the 
nondelegation doctrine provoked a sharp dissent from Justice 
Owen Roberts, who lamented that "in fact the Act sets no limits 
upon the discretion or judgment of the Administrator."119 In effect, 
Yakus signaled that the Court would no longer second-guess 
Congress's decision to entrust lawmaking power to federal 
agencies as long as Congress furnished some standard (however 
vague) to inform the agency's discretion.12° For convenience, this 
Article will refer to this idea that Congress may delegate far-
reaching lawmaking powers as the "delegation doctrine." 
Yakus's deferential approach toward congressional delegation of 
lawmaking authority aptly captures the Court's jurisprudence 
since Schechter Poultry. For the past seventy-five years, the Court 
has averted its eyes while Congress has enacted a host of 
115 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
116 321 u.s. 414 (1944). 
117 Id. at 420-21 (quoting the statute) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
11s Id. at 426. 
119 Id. at 451 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
120 The Court had sown the seeds for this change years earlier. See Panama Ref. Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (reasoning that Congress could delegate lawmaking power 
provided that it did not "transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it 
is ... vested"); Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922) 
(holding that some delegation of lawmaking power was acceptable as long as an agency's 
rulemaking authority did not constitute a "pure delegation of legislative power" (emphasis 
added)). 
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expansive delegations with only minimal policy guidance, 
including authorizing federal agencies to approve business 
consolidations "in the public interest"l21 and to regulate 
occupational environments for safety and health "to the extent 
feasible."122 Such nebulous congressional standards violate the 
spirit of checks and balances under Articles I and II123 and leave 
essential policy questions unresolved, thereby forcing agencies to 
decide fundamental matters of national policy downstream at the 
rulemaking and enforcement stages.124 Far from opposing such 
broad congressional delegations, the Court has reconciled itself to 
the pervasive practice of congressional delegation. On several 
occasions, the Court has acknowledged openly that Congress does, 
in fact, delegate legislative powers to agencies, 125 and Justices 
have questioned whether the Court is "qualified to second-guess 
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that 
can be left to [agencies]."126 Perhaps the most famous example of 
the delegation doctrine is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 127 where the Court cited 
Congress's delegation of lawmaking power to the Environmental 
Protection Agency as justification for deferring to the agency's 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act.12B By all indications, the Court 
121 New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932). 
122 Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton. Dust Case), 452 U.S. 490, 508 (1981); Indus. 
Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 612 (1980). 
123 See Panama Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 421 ("The Congress manifestly is not permitted to 
abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus 
vested."). 
124 See Cotton. Dust Case, 452 U.S. at 544, 547-48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Congress abdicated its responsibility for making difficult policy choices to agency). 
125 Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974); see also 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(arguing "that it would be both wiser and more faithful . .. in delegation cases to admit that 
agency rulemaking authority is 'legislative power' " (citations omitted)); Bowsher v. Synar, 
478 U.S. 714, 752 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[I)t is far from novel to acknowledge that 
independent agencies do indeed exercise legislative powers."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
985 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("[L]egislative power can be exercised by independent 
agencies and Executive departments."). 
126 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
128 !d. at 843-44; see also Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The 
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appears to have made peace with broad legislative delegations, 
giving Congress substantial discretion to entrust lawmaking 
authority to the Executive Branch outside the checks and balances 
of Articles I and II. 
From a republican perspective, there is much to admire about 
the delegation doctrine. To the extent that federal regulation is 
necessary to address domination emanating from the private 
sphere, administrative lawmaking may facilitate government 
responsiveness by expanding the federal government's capacity to 
react. This understanding of the liberty-enhancing potential of 
congressional delegation resonates with the Court's oft-repeated 
affirmation that "in our increasingly complex society, replete with 
ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply 
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad 
general directives."129 Further, congressional delegation of 
lawmaking powers may be "necessary and proper"130 if the federal 
government is to safeguard the public from private-sector 
domination.131 
On the other hand, the Court's acceptance of congressional 
delegation is also deeply troubling from a republican perspective to 
the extent that it magnifies the federal government's capacity for 
arbitrary lawmaking. If Congress may authorize federal agencies 
Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 
923 (2006) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine's erosion and the Chevron doctrine are 
logically intertwined); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A 
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 505 (2005) 
(observing that "Chevron relies on constitutional structure" and "Congress's legitimate 
authority to delegate lawmaking power"). 
129 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372; see also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 515 (1944) 
("Congress does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who 
must do it, and what is the scope of his authority. In our complex economy that indeed is 
frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward."). Even ardent 
supporters of the nondelegation doctrine have recognized that "[a]n absolutist position 
against delegation would be utter foolishness." Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: 
Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 295-96 (1987). 
130 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. 
131 See Merrill, supra note 110, at 2129--31 (noting that the power to transfer 
congressional authority can be implied from the Necessary and Proper Clause); cf. Am. 
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (observing that "[n]ecessity ... fixes a 
point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe 
detailed rules"). 
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to decide significant policy questions unilaterally outside the 
ordinary checks and balances of Articles I and II, this could 
undermine liberty by concentrating vast tracks of federal 
lawmaking power within the Executive Branch. Although 
Congress could enact new legislation to rescind agency rulemaking 
powers or to eliminate arbitrary regulations, the threat of a 
presidential veto together with the time and resources necessary 
for coordinated legislative action tend to entrench federal 
regulations against legislative repeal. As a result, congressional 
delegations potentially transfer federal lawmaking power from a 
regime with multiple institutional checks and balances-the 
legislative process-to one in which inter-branch checks and 
balances could be relatively diluted-the administrative process. 
These considerations led Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in 1969 to 
characterize the Court's delegation jurisprudence as "almost a 
complete failure" because it "failed to provide needed protection 
against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power."132 
The challenge for contemporary republicans is to explain how 
the Court's approval of congressional delegation can be reconciled 
with the republican ideals embodied in the Constitution's liberty-
promoting checks and balances. 
B. THE NEW NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
The Court has not been wholly inattentive to these republican 
concerns. As it has come to terms with congressional delegation, 
the Court also has taken steps to safeguard individual liberty by 
reformulating the nondelegation doctrine as an exercise in 
statutory interpretation. This so-called "new nondelegation 
doctrine" has two features. 133 First, the Court polices the limits of 
statutory delegations to ensure that agencies do not promulgate 
rules outside the scope of their entrusted authority.l34 Second, the 
132 Davis, supra note 12, at 713. 
133 See David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PITI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (describing the use of the new 
nondelegation doctrine). 
134 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000) 
(identifying the nondelegation canons used by courts to limit administrative agencies' 
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Court employs canons of statutory interpretation to narrow 
statutory delegations and to create meaningful statutory 
standards in contexts where capacious legislative delegations raise 
heightened concerns of administrative arbitrariness. 135 
Although superficially appealing, the new nondelegation 
doctrine does not adequately address the domination concerns that 
prompted courts to develop the nondelegation doctrine in the first 
place. From a republican perspective, the new nondelegation 
doctrine is plainly an unsatisfactory substitute. 
1. The Anti-Inherency Principle. The first feature of the new 
nondelegation doctrine is the principle that the Executive and 
Judicial Branches lack inherent authority to make federal law 
absent a discrete constitutional or statutory investiture. 136 Except 
for those narrow fields such as military discipline and judicial 
procedure where the Constitution authorizes the Executive and 
Judiciary to make rules unilaterally, these branches cannot make 
rules binding on the public unless authorized by federal legislation 
or treaty.137 As Professor Thomas Merrill has shown, this anti-
inherency principle can be understood to flow from the Vesting 
Clause of Article I, which dictates "that neither the [E]xecutive 
[B]ranch nor the [J]udicial [B]ranch has any power derived 
directly from the Constitution (as opposed to a statute) to make 
legislative rules on the subjects enumerated in Article 1."138 If the 
Executive or Judicial Branches assert authority to make rules 
with the force of law, they must be able to trace that authority to a 
discrete constitutional, statutory, or treaty-based delegation. 
The anti-inherency principle offers a helpful starting point for 
understanding when courts must defer to agency statutory 
interpretations. The Court has held that federal courts must defer 
powers). 
135 Id. 
136 Merrill, supra note 110, at 2101 (conceptualizing this anti-inherency principle as the 
assertion "that executive and judicial officers have no inherent authority to act with the 
force of law, but must trace any such authority to some provision of enacted law''). 
137 Id. at 2136 (''There can be no claim grounded in history and tradition that the 
executive or the courts enjoy a general, inherent power to promulgate legislative rules 
absent some delegation by Congress."). 
138 Id. at 2101 (emphasis omitted). 
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to administrative agencies' reasonable interpretations of 
ambiguous federal statutes.139 Subsequent cases, such as United 
States v. Mead Corp., 140 supplement this Chevron rule by clarifying 
that agency statutory interpretations only qualify for Chevron 
deference if the statutory scheme as a whole indicates that 
Congress intended to delegate authority to the agency to act with 
the force of law.141 Considerations relevant to this inquiry include 
whether Congress authorized the agency to promulgate 
regulations with the force of law, whether the agency's 
interpretation can be attributed to a politically accountable 
official, whether the agency is required to act through a reasonably 
deliberative process, and whether the agency's interpretation will 
facilitate a uniform national standard.142 
These elements of the Chevron/ Mead test are consistent with 
the anti-inherency principle to the extent that they seek to connect 
agency lawmaking authority with congressional intent. Just as 
federal agencies must be able to trace their exercises of 
rulemaking authority to particular constitutional, statutory, or 
treaty delegations, they also must show that their authority to 
promulgate legally binding statutory interpretations can plausibly 
be derived from a congressional delegation. Thus, the anti-
inherency principle provides a link between the emerging 
Chevron/Mead doctrine and judicial review of congressional 
delegations. 
Although the anti-inherency principle advances republican 
values by preventing agencies from asserting unilateral 
lawmaking authority without express constitutional investiture or 
congressional consent, it places no limits upon Congress's power to 
authorize administrative lawmaking by express delegation. In 
189 Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
140 533 u.s. 218 (2001). 
141 See, e.g., id. at 229 (holding that Chevron deference is warranted when there is 
uexpress congressional authorizations to engage in the rulemaking or adjudication process 
that produces the regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed"). Sunstein coined 
the term "Step Zero" to capture the idea that Mead:s inquiry serves as a gateway into the 
Chevron test. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006). 
142 See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1283-91 (2008) 
(describing the interplay between these and other indicators of congressional delegation). 
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theory, Congress could entrust all of its Article I, Section 8 powers 
to a single federal agency without providing any limiting 
principles and still satisfy the anti-inherency principle. This 
principle therefore does nothing to keep Congress from colluding 
with the President to authorize sweeping, unilateral executive 
lawmaking and, thus, to quiet republican concerns about the 
Court's new nondelegation doctrine. 
2. Nondelegation Canons. The second, more controversial 
feature of the Court's new nondelegation doctrine consists of what 
Professor Cass Sunstein has dubbed "nondelegation canons."143 
According to Sunstein, the Court has not abandoned its 
commitment to nondelegation values since the 1930s; it has merely 
adopted a new strategy to accomplish similar results. 144 Rather 
than strike down legislative delegations as overbroad, the new 
nondelegation doctrine employs canons of statutory interpretation 
to force Congress to make important policy choices related to 
delegation issues. Sunstein identifies constitutional avoidance as 
one such nondelegation canon: if a federal statute can bear two 
interpretations-one that would constitute an "intelligible 
principle" and another that would not-courts should adopt the 
interpretation that does not transgress the nondelegation 
doctrine. 145 Other canons that supposedly address nondelegation 
concerns include the judicial presumptions against 
"extraterritorial application of national law, intrusions on state 
sovereignty, decisions harmful to Native Americans, and absolutist 
approaches to health and safety."146 In theory, canons of statutory 
interpretation channel important policy decisions through the 
checks and balances of Article I by forcing Congress to provide 
clear direction if it intends to authorize administrative lawmaking 
in sensitive areas of public policy. Enforcing nondelegation 
143 See Sunstein, supra note 134, at 315-16 (describing the application of these canons). 
144 Jd. 
145 ld. at 316, 318. 
146 Id. at 315; see, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (requiring Congress 
to provide a clear statement of legislative intent before interpreting a statute to disturb the 
"usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government" (quoting 
Astascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 4 73 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
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principles through interpretive canons is "far preferable to the old 
nondelegation doctrine," Sunstein contends, because these canons 
"are subject to principled judicial application, and because they do 
not threaten to unsettle so much of modern government."147 
On several occasions, the Court has endorsed this idea that the 
nondelegation doctrine applies "principally'' through courts "giving 
narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might 
otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional."14B For instance, in 
National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. United States, the 
Court reviewed the FCC's authority under the Independent Offices 
Appropriations Act to promulgate regulations setting "fair and 
equitable" fees for certain cable television licenses.149 The 
petitioner, a trade association representing cable antenna 
television systems, challenged the FCC's assessment of licensing 
fees.150 The Court declined to address directly "[w]hether the 
present Act meets the [nondelegation] requirement of Schechter 
[Poultry] and Hampton."151 But the Court emphasized that "the 
hurdles revealed in those decisions" counseled "read[ing] the Act 
narrowly to avoid constitutional problems."152 The Court therefore 
construed the statute to require fees to be commensurate with 
their "value to the [license] recipient" and remanded the case back 
to the FCC for reconsideration under this standard.153 
Another case that attempts to address nondelegation concerns 
through statutory interpretation is Industrial Union Department 
v. American Petroleum Institute.154 There the Court reviewed a 
provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 that 
authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate standards 
147 Sunstein, supra note 134, at 315. 
148 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989); cf. Int'l Union v. OSHA, 938 
F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting the Court's "current general practice of applying 
the nondelegation doctrine mainly in the form of 'giving narrow constructions to statutory 
delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional'" (quoting Mistretta, 
488 U.S. at 373 n. 7)). 
149 415 u.s. 336, 337-40 (1974). 
150 Id. at 340. 
m Id. at 342. 
1s2 Jd. 
1sa Id. at 342-44. 
154 448 u.s. 607 (1980). 
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restricting occupational exposure to harmful substances at levels 
"reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful 
employment"155 and adequate to assure, "to the extent feasible, on 
the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity."156 
The Court rejected the government's argument that this provision 
did not require the Secretary to establish a statistically significant 
health risk at a particular exposure level. 157 "If the Government 
was correct" that the Secretary could prohibit even statistically 
insignificant risks to public health, "the statute would make such a 
'sweeping delegation of legislative power' that it might be 
unconstitutional .... A construction of the statute that avoids 
this kind of open-ended grant should certainly be favored."158 
Although the Court has accepted statutory interpretation as a 
new solution to old nondelegation concerns, there are serious 
reasons to doubt the adequacy of interpretive canons as functional 
substitutes for the traditional nondelegation doctrine. As 
Professor David Driesen has argued, most canons of statutory 
interpretation, such as the canon against extraterritorial 
application of federal law and the rule of lenity, have little to do 
with either nondelegation specifically or republican concerns for 
arbitrary decisionmaking more generally.l59 So-called 
nondelegation canons may be better described as anti-inherency 
canons to the extent that they formalize judicial presumptions 
about congressional intent. They also may safeguard important 
secondary values such as comity to other sovereigns, 16° individual 
freedoms, 161 or due process concerns.162 But nondelegation canons 
155 Id. at 612 (quoting 29 U.S. C. § 652(8)). 
156 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655{b)(5)). 
157 Id. at 646. 
158 Id. (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935)). 
159 Driesen, supra note 133, at 24-31; see also John F. Manning, Lessons from a 
Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1549 (2008) (noting that applying such 
canons will be difficult and comes down to "hard-to-define judgments"). 
160 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting that the 
extraterritoriality canon "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws 
and those of other nations which could result in international discord"). 
161 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (stating that the Court "will construe 
narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute" personal freedoms); see also BARBER, 
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"are not really aimed at the nondelegation problem at all, rather 
they limit agency discretion, if at all, incidentally and for other 
reasons."163 Nondelegation canons do not force Congress to 
establish intelligible principles for agencies to follow, nor do they 
address the potential for uncontrolled and vagrant administrative 
discretion. They simply incentivize Congress to delegate 
lawmaking authority more explicitly. 
These observations point toward another problem with this 
aspect of the new nondelegation doctrine: when courts impose 
narrowing constructions on vaguely worded statutes, they may 
undermine Congress's policy decisions or substitute their own 
policy preferences or the preferences of the Executive Branch.164 
Commentators have criticized the constitutional avoidance canon 
specifically as a device whereby courts may insinuate their own 
policy preferences into the regulatory process.165 When courts use 
interpretive canons to create intelligible principles to guide agency 
supra note 20, at 33 (arguing that the "point of confining discretion" in cases like Kent "is to 
remove the threat to [individual] rights, not to force lawmakers to assume responsibility for 
their violation," and that such cases ''have been interpreted as partial revivals of the 
delegation doctrine" only ''because the Court's desire to limit discretion is a feature of such 
decisions"). 
162 See Driesen, supra note 133, at 26 (observing that the rule of lenity is concerned 
primarily with notice). 
163 Id. at 31. 
164 See Indust. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring) (characterizing the absence of intelligible standards as delegating 
lawmaking authority to agencies "and, derivatively, to [the] Court"); Margaret H. Lemos, 
The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 405, 434 (2008) (noting cases in which "the Justices were not giving effect to 
Congress's intent so much as forging their own path"); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation 
Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 228 (arguing that the canon of 
avoidance "threatens to unsettle the legislative choice impact in adopting a broadly worded 
statute"). 
165 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 164, at 228 (stating that this canon "requires the 
judiciary, in effect, to rewrite the terms of a duly enacted statute"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2231 n.29 (1997) (noting that the 
"adoption of a narrowing construction ... confers on politically unaccountable judges the 
power to make fundamental policy decisions"). The constitutional avoidance canon is not 
unique in this respect; as Professor Karl Llewellyn observed long ago, the indeterminacy of 
interpretive canons raises the specter of subterranean judicial lawmaking in a wide variety 
of contexts. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 V AND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). 
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administration, this practice not only runs counter to the spirit of 
Chevron deference but also raises liberty concerns to the extent 
that courts are arguably subject to even weaker checks and 
balances than administrative agencies when they interpret 
statutes. 
In sum, if the traditional nondelegation doctrine aspired to 
promote republican liberty by funneling important lawmaking 
decisions through the checks and balances of Articles I and II, 
canons of statutory interpretation clearly are not a satisfactory 
functional substitute. At best, these canons bolster the 
Constitution's republican ideals only indirectly by suppressing 
ultra vires administrative lawmaking. At worst, they may simply 
exchange executive domination for judicial domination. 
C. THE PARADOX OF (NON)DELEGATION 
If the new nondelegation doctrine does not adequately 
safeguard republican values implicit in the Constitution's checks 
and balances, what should be done to safeguard individual liberty 
in the modern administrative state? 
Some scholars have argued that the only way to honor the 
Constitution's republican values is to reassert a formal distinction 
between legislative power, on the one hand, and executive or 
judicial powers, on the other.166 This approach would require the 
Court to reformulate the intelligible principle standard as 
something akin to a more-rigorous "determinate criterion" 
requirement-a step the Court previously has refused to take. 167 
The prospects for this approach in the Court are not promising; 
over the past half-century, only one Justice-Clarence Thomas-
has expressed enthusiasm for reviving the traditional 
166 See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 105, at 20-21 (arguing that the Court "should take 
the lead in bringing delegation to an end"); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, 
Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 263-64 (2010) 
(arguing that the Court needs to "develop[ ) a judicially manageable standard for 
distinguishing excessive or unjustified delegations from those meeting . . . 'the inherent 
necessities of the governmental co-ordination'" (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928))); Lawson, supra note 9, at 1237-39 (explaining the three 
branches of government and their purposes, as enumerated in the Constitution). 
167 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001). 
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nondelegation doctrine. 16B Despite some changes in the Court's 
composition since American Trucking, it is hard to imagine a 
majority of the Court endorsing this approach to congressional 
delegation in the future. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Court 
could define the distinction between "lawmaking'' and "execution" 
with sufficient clarity to enable federal courts to apply such a 
revitalized nondelegation doctrine consistently in a manner that 
would elude charges of judicial arbitrariness. 
A few critics of the nondelegation doctrine have taken the 
delegation doctrine to the opposite extreme, arguing that the 
intelligible principle requirement should be cast aside entirely in 
favor of a delegation doctrine that would permit wholly 
uncanalized administrative lawmaking.169 Such critics of the 
nondelegation doctrine generally argue that federal courts cannot 
enforce the intelligible principle standard in a coherent way that 
prevents administrative arbitrariness. Courts are better off 
jettisoning delegation review entirely in the interest of judicial 
restraint, they insist.l70 This approach, however, has been just as 
unpopular in the Court as proposals to revive the traditional 
nondelegation doctrine. Only one former Justice-Thurgood 
Marshall-has come close to endorsing this position, 171 and none of 
the current Justices have done so. Moreover, despite the Court's 
retreat from intensive nondelegation review in the decades since 
Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry, 172 it has not formally 
168 Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
169 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1721 (arguing that "a statutory grant of 
authority to the executive branch and other agencies can neuer amount to a delegation of 
legislative power" and "the constitution just doesn't contain any nondelegation principle of 
the sort the standard view supposes"). 
170 See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again.: The Non.delegation Doctrine, the 
Rules/Standards Dilemma an.d the Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189, 190-91 (1999) 
(characterizing the nondelegation doctrine as ''ultimately unworkable"); cf. Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J ., dissenting) (observing that "the debate 
over unconstitutional delegation" has become "a debate not over a point of principle but over 
a question of degree"). 
171 See Fed. Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (''The notion that the Constitution narrowly confines the power of 
Congress to delegate authority to administrative agencies, which was briefly in vogue in the 
1930's [sic), has been virtually abandoned by the Court for all practical purposes .... "). 
172 See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text. 
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abandoned the practice of reviewing congressional delegations for 
an intelligible principle.173 For these reasons, perhaps, even 
commentators critical of the nondelegation doctrine generally 
agree that the Court might revive the doctrine in a future case if 
presented with a delegation as sweeping and unchecked as that in 
Schechter Poultry. 174 
This Article argues that the case for terminating judicial review 
of congressional delegations remains unpersuasive because its 
proponents have not explained how sweeping, unchecked 
delegations can be reconciled with republican values implicit in 
the Constitution's checks and balances. In its 1996 decision 
Loving v. United States, 175 the Court explained why delegation 
review remains indispensible: 
Even before the birth of this country, separation of 
powers was known to be a defense against tyranny .... 
Though faithful to the precept that freedom is 
imperiled if the whole of legislative ... power is in the 
same hands, the Framers understood that a hermetic 
sealing off of the three branches of Government from 
one another would preclude the establishment of a 
Nation capable of governing itself effectively. 
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to 
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will 
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable 
173 See, e.g., Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (giving examples of cases where the Court 
reviewed congressional delegations for an intelligible principle); Loving v. United States, 
517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (reviewing a congressional delegation under the intelligible 
principle standard). 
174 See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 534-35 (1955) 
(authorizing the President to promulgate competition codes of conduct in any industry he 
chose); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 143 (2006) (noting that the delegation doctrine might be revived "if 
Congress abdicates its responsibilities again on the scale of Schechter [Poultry]"); Sunstein, 
supra note 134, at 328 ("In the most extreme cases, judicial invalidation is appropriate; 
none of the points made here is inconsistent with the view that Schechter Poultry was 
rightly decided."). 
175 517 u.s. 748. 
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government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness 
but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. 
Although separation of powers d[oes] not mean that 
these [three] departments ought to have no partial 
agency in, or no controul [sic] over the acts of each 
other, it remains a basic principle of our constitutional 
scheme that one branch of the Government may not 
intrude upon the central prerogatives of another .... 
. . . The fundamental precept of the delegation 
doctrine is that the lawmaking function belongs to 
Congress, and may not be conveyed to another branch 
or entity. This principle does not mean, however, that 
only Congress can make a rule of prospective force. To 
burden Congress with all federal rulemaking would 
divert that branch from more pressing issues, and 
defeat the Framers' design of a workable National 
Government. . . . This Court established long ago that 
Congress must be permitted to delegate to others at 
least some authority that it could exercise itself,l76 
In this passage, the Court pays homage to the Constitution's 
republican ideals, but it also unwittingly lays bare the enduring 
paradox at the heart of judicial review of congressional delegation. 
On the one hand, the Court affirms that legislative checks and 
balances are a ''basic principle of our constitutional scheme" for 
securing ordered liberty-a "fundamental precept" that may not be 
circumvented by transferring Congress's lawmaking function "to 
another branch or entity." In almost the same breath, however, 
the Court acknowledges that Congress's delegation of "authority 
that it could exercise itself' is necessary to realize the 
constitutional objective of a "workable National Government." The 
result is an apparent paradox: congress must honor the checks and 
balances of Article I to safeguard individual liberty from state 
domination, but it cannot perform its constitutional function to 
11s Id. at 756-58 (citations omitted). 
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safeguard individual liberty from private domination without 
delegating around those same constitutional constraints. 
Resolving this apparent paradox is no simple matter. In 
particular, how should federal courts honor the Constitution's 
republican design if neither the original nondelegation doctrine 
nor the new nondelegation doctrine is up to the task? In the 
discussion that follows, this Article takes up Loving's challenge by 
outlining a constitutional theory for judicial review of 
congressional delegations that offers a pathway out of the Court's 
current impasse. 
IV. DELEGATION, DOMINATION, AND DUE PROCESS 
What is needed is a new doctrine of constitutional delegation 
review-one capable of reconciling the Constitution's republican 
ideals with the practical imperatives of twenty-first century 
administrative lawmaking. This doctrine must accept the practice 
of administrative lawmaking as lawmaking; adherence to the 
nondelegation doctrine's formalist conception of legislative power 
will not do. But it must also preserve a principled role for federal 
courts in reviewing congressional delegation to address the 
domination concerns that arise whenever Congress entrusts 
lawmaking authority to agencies outside the constraints of Articles 
I and II. 
Fortunately, we need not look far for safe passage out of the 
delegation thicket. Our point of departure is the insight that 
congressional delegation is not constrained by separation of 
powers principles alone. Scattered throughout the Court's 
delegation jurisprudence are references to a second constitutional 
constraint on congressional delegation, one that complements the 
checks and balances of Articles I and II. This constraint has 
received scant consideration in academic commentary,177 and 
177 See, e.g., Robert E. Cushman, The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory 
Commissions, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 13, 32-33 (1938) (arguing that "the doctrine of the non-
delegability of legislative power could safely be scrapped as long as due process of law 
remains the effective constitutional guarantee it now is"); Davis, supra note 12, at 730 
(predicting that the nondelegation doctrine would likely "merge with the concept of due 
process" in the future); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REV. 
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although the Court alluded to this constraint in several cases 
between the 1930s and 1970s, it has not received sustained 
attention in federal courts for decades. This neglected 
constitutional constraint is the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause. 
This Part explains how due process principles constrain 
congressional delegation and argues that this due process model 
offers an attractive alternative to nondelegation theories based 
solely upon separation of powers principles. As other legal 
scholars have observed, the nondelegation doctrine and due 
process share a common republican concern: to promote liberty by 
reducing the federal government's capacity for arbitrariness.l78 
Unlike the formalist nondelegation doctrine, however, the due 
process model offers a practical framework for allowing 
congressional delegation to combat private domination without 
compromising the republican ideal of ordered liberty. This due 
process model answers Davis's call for federal courts to develop a 
delegation doctrine based not only upon the need for substantive 
standards but also upon procedural and structural safeguards to 
protect the public against unchecked administrative lawmaking. 179 
In the discussion that follows, this Part identifies three 
dimensions of constitutional due process that are particularly 
salient for constraining congressional delegation. First, as a 
matter of substantive due process, Congress may not entrust 
lawmaking authority to the other branches without prescribing 
201, 248 (1937) (suggesting that the nondelegation doctrine could be eliminated in favor of 
"regard[ing) the question simply as one of reasonableness within the due process clause"); 
Ann Woolhandler, Delegatwn and Due Process: The Historical Connectwn, 2008 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 225 (discussing links between delegation and due process during the nineteenth 
century). 
178 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 525 (noting that the Court's decisions on congressional 
delegations "can be understood to invalidate delegations that increase the possibility of 
arbitrary action to unacceptable levels"); Brown, supra note 12, at 1553 (stating that "the 
concerns that the [nondelegation] doctrine is intended to address are, at bottom, procedural 
due-process concerns"); Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE L.J. 657, 
659 (arguing that due process implements the nondelegation doctrine). 
179 See Davis, supra note 12, at 725 (arguing that "the purpose of the non-delegation 
doctrine should no longer be ... to prevent delegation" but rather "the much deeper one of 
protecting against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power"). 
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substantive constraints that are sufficient to ensure that agency 
discretion is not wholly unfettered. Second, procedural due 
process requires agencies to exercise their lawmaking powers 
through liberty-enhancing procedures characterized by reasoned 
deliberation and justification. Third, when Congress delegates 
lawmaking authority to administrative agencies, structural due 
process requires that agency lawmakers be subject to meaningful 
political accountability and that persons adversely affected by 
agency action have an opportunity to test the constitutional 
adequacy of Congress's delegation through judicial review. In 
short, if Congress wishes to delegate lawmaking authority, it must 
constrain that authority in such a way that the other branches will 
have no greater capacity for arbitrariness than Congress itself 
possesses when making law under Articles I and II. A due 
process-based approach to congressional delegation offers the best 
model for achieving this republican ideal. 
A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
In the Court, substantive due process has long been considered 
a close cousin of nondelegation. The familial resemblance between 
these two doctrines has exposed the latter to criticism, as legal 
scholars have drawn links between nondelegation cases such as 
Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry, 180 and the now-infamous 
substantive due process jurisprudence of the Lochner era.181 While 
these negative associations may be overstated, the conceptual 
links between nondelegation, on the one hand, and due process, on 
the other, cannot be so easily dismissed. During the same period 
when the nondelegation doctrine was reaching maturity, the Court 
also was developing a parallel due process doctrine: according to 
the Court, vaguely worded legislative delegations violated the due 
process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
because they raised an unconstitutional risk of administrative 
180 See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text. 
181 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52, 64 (1905) (invalidating a state labor law 
that capped worker hours); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 133 (1980) (characterizing the nondelegation doctrine's demise as "death 
by association"). 
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arbitrariness.182 The Court also indicated in a number of cases 
that the constitutionality of congressional delegations would 
depend upon whether administrative procedures adequately 
safeguarded the public against domination.1B3 Collectively, these 
principles underscore the vital, if largely unappreciated, role that 
due process plays as a safeguard for individual liberty in the 
administrative state. 
The emergence of substantive due process as a constraint on 
legislative delegations can be traced to federal courts' review of 
state legislative delegations in the late nineteenth century. An 
early example is the 1886 case Yick Wo v. Hopkins.l 84 At issue was 
a San Francisco county ordinance that required prospective small-
business owners to obtain the permission of the county board of 
supervisors before opening a new laundry. 1B5 The county board, by 
its own admission, had used its discretionary licensing authority 
under the local ordinance to deny business licenses to Chinese 
immigrants. 186 The Court concluded that the ordinance was 
unconstitutionally vague because it "seem[ed] intended to confer, 
and actually to [have] confer[red] ... a naked and arbitrary power 
to give or withhold consent, not only as to places, but as to 
persons."187 In effect, the ordinance instituted domination by 
subjecting prospective business owners to the "mere will" of county 
board members, a "purely arbitrary" discretion that 
"acknowledge[d] neither guidance nor restraint."188 As the Court 
explained, such domination was antithetical to the Constitution's 
republican values: 
182 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. 
REV. 1669, 167!Hl1 (1975) (detailing the Court's response to "[v]ague, general or ambiguous 
statutes ... [that] threaten the legitimacy of agency action"). 
183 See id. at 1676 ("Insofar as statutes do not effectively dictate agency actions, individual 
autonomy is vulnerable to the imposition of sanctions at the unruled will of executive 
officials ... who are not formally accountable to the electorate .... "). 
184 118 u.s. 356 (1886). 
185 Id. at 357. 
186 Id. at 374. 
187 Id. at 366. 
186 Id. at 366-67. 
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When we consider the nature and the theory of our 
institutions of government, the principles upon which 
they are supposed to rest, and review the history of 
their development, we are constrained to conclude that 
they do not mean to leave room for the play and action 
of purely personal and arbitrary power .... [I]n our 
system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the 
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains 
with the people, by whom and for whom all 
government exists and acts. And the law is the 
definition and limitation of power ... so that, in the 
famous language of the Massachusetts bill of rights, 
the government of the commonwealth "may be a 
government of laws and not of men." For the very idea 
that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the 
means of living, or any material right essential to the 
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to 
be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, 
as being the essence of slavery itself.l89 
161 
These same republican principles had important implications 
for "the quasi-legislative acts of inferior municipal bodies," the 
Court observed.19o Municipal bodies exercising delegated 
lawmaking powers must employ this entrusted authority 
"reasonabl[y]" and in conformity "with the general principles of the 
common law of the land, particularly those having relation to the 
liberty of the subject."191 While the Court declined to decide 
whether the San Francisco county ordinance was invalid on its 
face, 192 the strong implication of its reasoning was that the 
legislative delegation itself constituted an unconstitutional 
entrustment of arbitrary power.193 
tB9 Id. at 369-70. 
too Id. at 371. 
t9t Id. 
192 Ultimately, the Court determined that it did not have to reach this question because 
the board's application of the county ordinances clearly violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 374. 
'
93 See Woolhandler, supra note 177, at 240 (noting that "the Court adverted to 
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State courts picked up on Yick Wo's significance for delegations 
to the executive branch. For example, in the 1917 decision Board 
of Administration of fllinois v. Miles, 194 the Illinois Supreme Court 
reviewed a state law that required the estates of patients in state 
mental asylums to make financial contributions to support the 
patients' care and authorized hospital boards to make exceptions 
to "release or modify" this payment requirement "in any case 
where the circumstances may justify it."195 The court held that the 
provision for exceptions violated due process under the Illinois 
constitution insofar as it gave the hospital unfettered discretionary 
power.196 "Any law which vests in the discretion of administrative 
officers the power to determine whether the law shall or shall not 
be enforced with reference to individuals in the same situation, 
without any rules or limitations for the exercise of such discretion, 
is unconstitutional," the court explained.197 
Three years later, the Illinois Supreme Court returned to these 
problems in People ex rel. Gamber v. Sholem.198 A state statute 
authorized fire marshals to condemn buildings "for want of proper 
repair, or by reason of age and dilapidated condition, or for any 
cause" that would render buildings "especially liable to fire" or a 
danger to other buildings, property, or persons during a fire. 199 
The court reasoned that this proVISion effectively left 
condemnation decisions "entirely within the discretion of the fire 
marshal."200 In the absence of a more uniform rule by which the 
fire marshal was to act, the court considered the statute an 
unconstitutional "delegation of legislative and judicial 
nonarbitrariness as a condition of delegation in [Yick Wo]"); cf Holmes v. New York City 
Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) ("It hardly need be said that the existence of 
an absolute and uncontrolled discretion in an agency of government ... would be an 
intolerable invitation to abuse . . . . For this reason alone due process requires that 
selections among applicants be made in accordance with 'ascertainable standards.' " 
(citation omitted)). 
194 115 N.E. 841 (Ill. 1917). 
195 Id. 
100 Id. at 842. 
t97 Id. 
198 128 N.E. 377 (Ill. 1920). 
199 Id. at 378. 
20° Id. at 379. 
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authority."201 Although the court invoked the structural principle 
that "the power to make laws ... cannot be delegated,"202 it 
quickly pivoted to cite Yick Wo and Miles for the proposition-
anchored in notions of due process-that "arbitrary discretion" 
enables "unjust discrimination."203 To the court, these two 
constitutional bases for nondelegation-separation of powers and 
due process-represented mutually reinforcing elements of the 
Constitution's republican order. 
The Court reaffirmed the due process constraints on legislative 
delegation in its 1928 decision State of Washington ex rel. Seattle 
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge.204 At issue was a local zoning ordinance 
that required landowners to acquire the consent of two-thirds of 
their neighbors before constructing a philanthropic home for 
children or the elderly.205 Although the Court acknowledged that 
this zoning ordinance was likely adopted for a benign purpose, it 
expressed concern that the ordinance left neighbors "free to 
withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may subject 
the trustee to their will or caprice."206 For the Court, the problem 
with this delegation was not simply that the approval procedure 
empowered private delegates, but that it did so without any 
substantive standard to limit those delegates' discretion. 207 
Recognizing that the ordinance introduced domination, the Court 
cited Yick Wo and held that "[t]he delegation of power so 
attempted is repugnant to the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."20S 
2°1 Id. at 378. 
202 Jd. 
20a Id. at 380. 
204 278 u.s. 116 (1928). 
205 Id. at 117-18. 
200 Id. at 122. 
201 Jd. 
2°8 Id.; see also Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 400--01, 405--{)6 (1926) (striking down a 
state ordinance authorizing the creation of local road districts to levy taxes and fees without 
any legislative standard); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143--44 (1912) 
(striking down a similar statute based on the absence of a "standard by which the power 
thus given is to be exercised''). Although the delegation in Roberge was to private parties, 
lower courts have recognized that the Court's primary concern was the potential for 
arbitrariness stemming from the absence of substantive constraints. See, e.g., Young v. City 
of Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 820 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a local zoning ordinance that 
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What is especially striking about these due process cases is how 
closely they resemble the Court's nondelegation jurisprudence of 
the same period. Although the Court generally invoked 
substantive due process in state cases and nondelegation norms in 
federal cases, by the early twentieth century the constitutional 
standards applied in these two lines of cases had essentially 
converged. Whether analyzed from a due process perspective or a 
nondelegation perspective, both traditions asked essentially the 
same question: whether the legislature had enjoined upon its 
delegate an intelligible substantive principle to ensure that 
regulatory powers were not subject to the delegate's wholly 
unfettered discretion. 209 
A prime example of this convergence in nondelegation and 
substantive due process analysis is Panama Refining, where the 
Court for the first time set aside a federal statute on nondelegation 
grounds. Recall that in Panama Refining the Court held that 
Congress transgressed the nondelegation doctrine by failing to 
establish any factual criteria or legislative principles to guide its 
delegate's discretion-here, the President's decision whether to 
prohibit the transportation of hot oil.210 While the Court 
emphasized the formal distinction between legislative and 
executive power, 211 its analysis was otherwise scarcely 
distinguishable from the inquiry pursued in the Yick Wo line of 
cases. The problem with the statute in question, the Court 
explained, was that it gave "the President an unlimited authority 
to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to 
lay it down, as he may see fit."212 As in Yick Wo, Miles, Gamber, 
and Roberge, the Court expressed concern that Congress had 
empowered private citizens "to block adult uses for the purpose of suppressing (speech]" to 
be facially unconstitutional); Moore v. City of Kirkland, 2006 WL 1993443, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. 2006) (clarifying that a delegation of power to private individuals is not 
unconstitutional of itself, but rather a delegation to private individuals that subjects others 
to their "will or caprice" may violate due process (quoting Roberge, 278 U.S. at 122)). 
209 See Abramson, supra note 12, at 208-10 (criticizing cases for "commingling" due 
process and nondelegation). 
210 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418-19, 423 (1935). 
211 Id. at 421. 
212 Id. at 415. 
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empowered executive officers to act outside meaningful statutory 
constraints according to their own arbitrary will. The Court 
characterized the constitutional difficulty in Panama Refining as a 
transfer of legislative power to the executive, but it could have 
characterized the challenge just as easily as an investiture of 
arbitrary executive power in violation of due process, as in the 
Yick Wo line of cases. While the Court did not expressly say as 
much in Panama Refining, the statute's delegation of arbitrary 
power213 to the President was as much a Fifth Amendment due 
process problem as it was a separation of powers problem. 
In both his Panama Refining dissenting opinion and his 
Schechter Poultry concurrence, Justice Cardozo characterized 
judicial delegation review as an inquiry into whether the 
Executive Branch's discretion was entirely "unconfined and 
vagrant."214 Judicial intervention would be appropriate only 
where Congress had granted the Executive Branch a "roving 
commission to inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them, 
do anything [it] pleases."215 This formulation foreshadowed the 
contemporary delegation doctrine by permitting agencies to make 
law outside the constraints of Article I as long as their discretion 
was not wholly unrestrained. Cardozo made no attempt to link his 
approach to separation of powers formalism, let alone Lockean 
theories about popular consent. Indeed, he expressly rejected the 
idea that "separation of powers between the Executive and 
Congress" was "a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with 
pedantic rigor."216 Instead, he framed delegation review in terms 
that closely mirrored the substantive due process model of 
legislative delegation from Yick Wo and its progeny: as long as 
Congress had provided some statutory standard to prevent its 
213 Although the Court disagreed, Justice Cardozo made a strong argument in dissent that 
the statute does not, in fact, give the President arbitrary power because the President's 
discretion is limited by the general policies set forth in other parts of the statute. Id. at 
433-48 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
214 Id. at 440; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935). 
215 Panama Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 435 (Cardozo, J., dissenting); Schecter Poultry, 295 U.S. 
at 55 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
216 Panama Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 440 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
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delegate from acting as a "roving commission," Congress would 
have satisfied its essential constitutional obligation.217 
Viewing the contemporary delegation doctrine through the lens 
of substantive due process rather than separation of powers 
formalism helps to explain the current contours of the delegation 
doctrine, and it resolves some of the logical contradictions in the 
Court's jurisprudence. In the due process model, Congress must 
establish substantive standards to prevent the Executive Branch 
from exercising substantively unfettered lawmaking power, not to 
draw an arbitrary line in the sand between legislative and 
executive power. Beyond the minimalist intelligible principle 
requirement, Congress is free to decide how narrowly it will tailor 
an agency's lawmaking discretion. This approach to judicial 
review might not constrain Congress as firmly as the traditional 
nondelegation doctrine, but it does afford some protection against 
congressional attempts to delegate around the checks and balances 
of Articles I and II. 21s 
Recognizing the republican linkages between substantive due 
process and the traditional intelligible principle requirement 
reinforces the contemporary delegation doctrine, but it does not 
fully reconcile administrative lawmaking with the Constitution's 
217 Id. at 435. The Court continues to apply due process explicitly as a constraint against 
unconstitutionally vague delegations of authority to state officers. See, e.g., Chicago v. 
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (striking down a statute criminalizing loitering because it 
"authorize[d] and even encourage[d] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"); id. at 71 
(Breyer, J., concurring) ("The ordinance is unconstitutional, not because a policeman 
applied this discretion wisely or poorly in a particular case, but rather because the 
policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case."); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
358 (1983) (striking down a loitering statute that was deemed to vest "virtually complete 
discretion in the hands of the police"). 
218 The Court's delegation cases since Schechter Poultry are consistent with the due 
process approach outlined in this section. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 
U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (rejecting the argument that Congress must establish a determinate 
criterion rather than a mere intelligible principle); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 
426 (1944) (reasoning that courts should not strike down delegations as overbroad save in 
"an absence of standards for the guidance" of executive authority); Nat'! Broad. Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (upholding a statutory standard that does not 
establish "a standard so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power"); Mulford v. Smith, 307 
U.S. 38, 49 (1939) (inquiring whether Congress had conferred "unrestrained arbitrary 
power on an executive officer"); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 17 (1939) (inquiring whether 
the agency possessed "unfettered discretion"). 
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republican vision of ordered liberty. Whether viewed as a 
separation of powers doctrine or a due process doctrine, the 
intelligible principle requirement does not fully protect the public 
from the enhanced threat of arbitrariness that arises when 
Congress authorizes agencies to exercise sweeping lawmaking 
powers outside the checks and balances of Articles I and II. Some 
further constraint is necessary to ensure that congressional 
delegation does not beget domination. For the due process model 
to be successful as such a constraint, courts must look beyond 
substantive due process to the complementary constraints of 
procedural and structural due process. 
B. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
The idea that procedural due process constrains Congress's 
authority to entrust lawmaking power to administrative agencies 
cuts against the grain of conventional wisdom. Leading 
administrative law treatises declare unequivocally that "due 
process applies only to individualized decisionmaking" rather than 
general "policy-based deprivations."219 This view can be traced to 
the 1915 decision Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization,220 where the Court held that due process does not 
require a municipality to give property owners an opportunity for 
an individualized, adversarial-type hearing before assessing an 
across-the-board tax on real property.221 In its opinion the Court 
took pains to limit the Due Process Clause's application to 
rulemaking proceedings: 
The Constitution does not require all public acts to be 
done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. 
General statutes within the state power are passed 
that affect the person or property of individuals, 
219 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 9.2, at 737 (5th ed. 2010); 
see also CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.20, at 73 (2d ed., 
1997) (stating that due process adjudication, and not rulemaking, is required when 
decisions are made on "individual grounds"). 
220 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
221 Id. at 445. 
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sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a 
chance to be heard .... There must be a limit to 
individual argument in such matters if government is 
to go on.222 
Over time, the Court has construed this language to stand for the 
proposition that the Due Process Clause does not obligate agencies 
to solicit public input during administrative rulemaking 
proceedings because individuals have no constitutional right to be 
heard when agencies engage in generalized policymaking.223 
Although the Court has rejected an individual constitutional 
right to participate in agency rulemaking, it does not necessarily 
follow that procedural due process has no application whatsoever 
to agency rulemaking, as some commentators have suggested.224 
As Professor Hans Linde famously argued, one function of the Due 
Process Clause is to safeguard the integrity of the legislative 
process.225 Ordinarily, when Congress makes law through the 
process prescribed in Article I, Section 7, its ''legislative 
determination provides all the process that is due."226 On the 
222 Id.; see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 
519, 542 (1978) (holding that due process safeguards may be necessary in rulemaking 
proceedings when a small number of people are exceptionally affected); United States v. 
Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 246 (1973) (holding that railroads were not prejudiced 
by the absence of oral hearings regarding an industrywide increase in rates); Bowles v. 
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944) (rejecting the notion that the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942 violated landlord's Fifth Amendment right to due process, even though 
"it makes no provision for a hearing to landlords before the order or regulation fixing rents 
becomes effective"). 
223 See, e.g., Minn. State Bd. of Cmty. Colis. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (noting 
that the Constitution does not provide for public participation in policymaking decisions); 
see also Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he general theory 
of republican government is not due process through individual hearings ... but through 
elective representation, partisan politics, and the ultimate sovereignty of the people to vote 
out of office those legislators who are unfaithful to the public will."). 
224 See, e.g., 2 PIERCE, supra note 219, at 740-42 (stating that pragmatic concerns-the 
differences between adjudicative facts and legislative facts-and Constitutional concerns 
explain why due process should not apply to agency rulemaking). But see KOCH, supra note 
219, at 74 (asserting that "there are no compelling conceptual reasons for exempting 
rulemaking procedures from the Due Process Clause''). 
225 Hans A Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 253-54 (1976). 
22s Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982); see also Philip Frickey, The 
Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct Democracy, and the 
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other hand, federal courts have reasoned that "an individual 
claiming a defect in the legislative process might have a claim for 
due process."227 Addressing this potential application of the Due 
Process Clause, Professor Laurence Tribe has suggested that "the 
way a rule is generated-by what kind of governmental body, on 
what evidentiary basis, through how accountable and transparent 
a process-plays a decisive role in its validity."228 
The Due Process Clause's application to congressional 
lawmaking has important implications for legislative delegations 
to administrative agencies. Specifically, due process of lawmaking 
prohibits Congress from entrusting lawmaking authority to 
agencies outside the constraints of liberty-conserving 
administrative procedures. In other words, to satisfy due process, 
administrative rulemaking procedures must be sufficiently fair 
and deliberative to ensure, at a minimum, that an agency's 
institutional capacity for arbitrariness in the administrative 
process is not manifestly greater than Congress's capacity for 
arbitrariness in the legislative process.229 While due process does 
not require any "particular form of procedure" in rulemaking 
proceedings,23° Congress must take care to prescribe procedural 
Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAME'ITE L. REV. 421, 444 (1998) ("Federal 
constitutional law conclusively presumes that ... the legislative process [satisfies due 
process because, among other things, it] develop(s] the relevant facts and legal standards so 
that people are not deprived of important rights or interests based on erroneous 
assumptions."). 
227 Rea v. Matteucci, 121 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (citing Atkins v. 
Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985)). See generally Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, 
Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281 
(2002) (examining how "semisubstantive" doctrines have been used in the Rehnquist Court 
to correct procedural errors or omissions by lawmakers). 
228 1 TRIBE, supra note 111, at 1372 (citing, inter alia, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 
U.S. 88 (1976)); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.2, at 
1679 n.11 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that "Justice Stevens has also argued that 'the character of 
[congressional] procedures [should] be considered relevant to the decision whether the 
legislative process has ... [violated the equal protection component of] due process' " 
(alterations in original) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550-51 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
229 See Pittston Co. v. United States, 368 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the 
nondelegation doctrine ensures "that delegation does not frustrate the constitutional 
design"). 
230 Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Mills, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945); see also Mathews v. 
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safeguards that will prevent delegations of lawmaking authority 
from introducing domination that would subvert the republican 
ideals implicit in the checks and balances of Articles I and 11.231 
Although rarely acknowledged m administrative law 
scholarship, the Court's delegation jurisprudence generally 
supports this principle that due process imposes procedural 
constraints on congressional delegation. The idea that agencies 
must employ fair and deliberative procedures when they make law 
has been a recurring leitmotif in the Court's nondelegation 
jurisprudence, almost from the doctrine's inception.232 In Wichita 
Railroad & Light Co. u. Public Utilities Commission of the State of 
Kansas, 233 for example, the Court famously declared that "the 
Legislature, to prevent [the entrustment of lawmaking authority 
from] being a pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin 
upon [an agency] a certain course of procedure and certain rules of 
decision in the performance of its function."234 An agency, in turn, 
must "show substantial compliance" with the procedures Congress 
has established "to give validity to its action."235 One important 
implication of this constitutional connection between delegation 
and administrative procedure is that an agency must provide 
discrete factual findings whenever Congress requires such findings 
as a predicate for administrative rulemaking.236 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (observing that "'[d]ue process' .. . is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content" but a "flexible" one that "calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands" (citations omitted)). 
231 As one state court has observed, the relevant question is not simply "whether the 
statute delegating the power expresses standards, but whether the procedure established 
for the exercise of the power furnishes adequate safeguards to those who are affected by the 
administrative action." Warren v. Marion Cnty., 353 P.2d 257, 261 (Or. 1960). 
232 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 19, at 492-94 (discussing the need for "reasoned 
decisionmaking'' in agency rulemaking); Stack, supra note 12, at 987-88 (discussing the 
need for procedural safeguards in exercising delegated authority). 
233 260 u.s. 48 (1922). 
234 Id. at 59; see also Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (holding that even 
the President, when "invested with legislative authority as the delegate of 
Congress ... necessarily acts under the constitutional restriction applicable to such 
delegation"); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 (1924) ("It is essential that, where an executive 
is exercising delegated legislative power he should substantially comply with all the 
statutory requirements in its exercise .... "). 
23S Wichita, 260 U.S. at 59. 
236 Id. 
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Other leading cases confirm that delegation and administrative 
procedure are inextricably linked. The Court reaffirmed the 
importance of deliberative administrative procedure in the same 
case in which it first formulated the nondelegation doctrine's 
intelligible principle standard.237 In describing the President's 
limited discretion under the Tariff Act of 1922, the Court 
emphasized that ''before the President reaches a conclusion on the 
subject of investigation, the Tariff Commission must make an 
investigation, and in doing so must give notice to all parties 
interested and an opportunity to adduce evidence and to be 
heard."23B In the Court's view, "common sense" would permit 
Congress to delegate "the fixing of such rates" to an administrative 
agency if the agency acted "after hearing evidence and argument 
concerning [the rates] from interested parties."239 
Administrative procedure also featured prominently in Panama 
Refining and Schechter Poultry. In both cases, the Court's 
nondelegation analysis focused primarily on the absence of 
statutory standards to prevent the President from wielding 
arbitrary power240-a concern that the nondelegation doctrine 
shares with due process. But the Court also implied that the 
constitutional difficulties posed in these cases would not be 
resolved by imposing standards alone. Invoking Wichita, the 
Court in Panama Refining emphasized that for a "delegation of 
legislative power" to be valid, "due process of law requires that it 
shall appear that the [regulation] is within the authority of the 
[delegate], and, if that authority depends on determinations of 
fact, those determinations must be shown."241 Similarly, in 
Schechter Poultry the Court described the delegating statute as an 
237 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
238 ld. at 405. 
239 ld. at 407--08. The Court also noted that the agency's actions must accord with the 
congressional rule that the rates must be just and reasonable, considering the service given, 
and not discriminatory. ld. 
240 See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text. 
241 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935} (quoting and discussing Witchita); 
see also Stack, supra note 12, at 987-88 (stating that the Court's holding was based on the 
President's failure to articulate the predicate grounds for his actions that would effectively 
constrain the delegated powers). 
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unprecedented threat to liberty not only because Congress did "not 
undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular 
states of fact," but also because it failed to impose "appropriate 
administrative procedure[s]" for determining the application of 
such rules to facts. 242 In short, Congress's failure to prescribe 
appropriate administrative procedures for carrying out its 
delegated authority raised constitutional concerns sounding in due 
process. 
The Court returned to this theme in Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co.,243 when it considered a provision of the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1935 authorizing mine producers and workers 
to establish legally binding local-wage-and-hour regulations by 
majority vote. 244 This was "legislative delegation in its most 
obnoxious form," the Court reasoned, because Congress had 
conferred upon a majority of mine producers and workers "the 
power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority."245 
According to the Court, Congress's decision to commit public 
lawmaking power to the majority vote of these private parties was 
insufficient to safeguard the public against arbitrariness: "The 
delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights 
safeguarded by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fifth 
Amendment, that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to 
242 A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935). 
243 298 u.s. 238 (1936). 
244 Id. at 278, 310-11. 
245 Id. at 311. In academic commentary, Carter Coal is often pigeon-holed as a case about 
privatization. See, e.g., David Horton, Arbitration. as Delegation., 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 476 
(2011) (stating that the Carter Coal Court invalidated the law "on private delegation 
grounds"). Yet the Court's primary concern arguably was not the transfer of lawmaking 
power into private hands per se, but rather the transfer of lawmaking power from the 
Article I process, with its checks and balances, into a procedure governed by unchecked 
majoritarianism. In subsequent cases, lower courts have invalidated delegations to private 
parties in the absence of either intelligible principles or procedural safeguards that would 
safeguard the public from arbitrariness. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of 
Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1450, 1458-59 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding it a disputed question of 
material fact whether a New York labor law was an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative authority as applied because the state labor department failed to establish 
procedures for independently determining whether the labor unions' estimates of prevailing 
wages were accurate). 
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decisions of this court which foreclose the question."246 Justice 
Hughes, who filed a partial dissent, concurred with this aspect of 
the majority's judgment: "Such a provision, apart from the mere 
question of the delegation of legislative power, is not in accord 
with the requirement of due process of law which under the Fifth 
Amendment dominates the regulations which Congress may 
impose."247 
Three years later, the Court reaffirmed the link between 
congressional delegation and administrative procedure in United 
States v. Rock Royal Co-Op, Inc.24B Under the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture 
had promulgated an order regulating the handling of milk in the 
New York metropolitan area.249 After determining that the Act 
specified a suitable standard to limit the Secretary's discretion in 
exercising the delegated authority, the Court proceeded further to 
consider the Secretary's compliance with the Act's procedural 
hearing requirements. 250 The Court noted that the Secretary had 
conducted public hearings in five cities, had compiled nearly three 
thousand pages of testimony, and had collected written 
submissions from some twenty interested parties.251 Summarizing 
its review of the Secretary's decisionmaking process, the Court 
explained that although "procedural safeguards cannot validate an 
unconstitutional delegation, they do furnish protection against an 
arbitrary use of properly delegated authority."252 Rock Royal thus 
suggested that administrative procedures are germane to judicial 
review of congressional delegations because substantive and 
procedural constraints both serve the same purpose: preserving 
individual liberty from arbitrary administrative regulation. 
Similar concerns animated the Court's 194 7 decision SEC v. 
Chenery Corp.253 At bottom, Chenery stands for the "simple but 
246 Carter Coal, 208 U.S. at 311. 
247 Id. at 318 (Hughes, J., dissenting). 
248 307 u.s. 533 (1939). 
249 ld. at 539-40. 
250 ld. at 574-76. 
251 ld. at 576. 
252 Id. 
253 332 u.s. 194 (1947). 
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fundamental rule" that when federal courts review agency action 
under the APA, they may consider only those official explanations 
that the agency provides contemporaneously with its decision, not 
post hoc rationales.254 Professor Kevin Stack has argued recently 
that Chenery advances nondelegation values by compelling 
administrative agencies to explain how their actions implement 
congressional directives.255 In particular, Stack emphasizes that 
Chenery bolsters the nondelegation doctrine's anti-inherency 
principle by ensuring that agencies do not make law without 
grounding their action in a discrete congressional authorization.256 
But as Stack acknowledges, Chenery also advances due process 
concerns insofar as it enjoins upon agencies a "course of procedure" 
they must follow when making rules with the force of law.257 The 
Chenery doctrine thus represents yet another manifestation of the 
relationship between congressional delegation and procedural due 
process doctrines. 
Perhaps the clearest affirmation that due process constrains 
congressional delegation is the Court's 1976 decision Hampton u. 
Mow Sun Wong.258 There, five former federal employees 
challenged their terminations under a regulation adopted by the 
Civil Service Commission, which excluded most noncitizens from 
federal employment.259 In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, 
the Court acknowledged that the Equal Protection Clause likely 
would not prohibit Congress from imposing a citizenship 
requirement for service in the federal government.26° Nonetheless, 
the Court resisted the notion that an "agent of the National 
Government may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different 
substantive rules from those applied to citizens."261 Invoking the 
Fifth Amendment, the Court reasoned that "due process requires 
that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was 
254 Id. at 196. 
255 Stack, supra note 12, at 992. 
256 Id. at 996--97. 
257 Id. at 984 (quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 (1924)). 
258 426 u.s. 88 (1976). 
259 I d. at 90. 
260 Id. at 100-01. 
261 Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
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actually intended to serve [an overriding national] interest."262 If 
Congress was not going to make this determination itself, due 
process required the delegate to affrrmatively justify the rule ''by 
reasons which are properly the concern of that agency."263 While 
the Court's rationale was not crystal clear, it apparently concluded 
that the Fifth Amendment constrained congressional delegation by 
requiring agencies to employ their delegated lawmaking powers 
through a decisionmaking process characterized by reasoned 
deliberation.264 This implication of the majority's analysis was not 
lost on Justice Rehnquist, who complained in dissent that the 
majority's decision would cause the constitutionality of 
congressional delegations to "depend upon the procedural 
requirements of the Due Process Clause."265 Mow Sun Wong thus 
suggests, contrary to conventional wisdom, that procedural due 
process does apply to constrain administrative rulemaking. 
Although individuals lack a due process right to individualized 
notice and to a hearing when agencies engage in generalized 
rule making, 266 Mow Sun Wong establishes that the Fifth 
Amendment protects them from agency regulations that are not 
the product of appropriately fair and deliberative procedures.267 
Collectively, the Court's delegation cases, culminating with 
Mow Sun Wong, support the principle that the Constitution 
requires Congress to constrain administrative lawmaking not just 
substantively but also procedurally. Wichita, Panama Refining, 
and Schechter Poultry suggest that Congress bears a responsibility 
to limit agencies' capacity for arbitrary decisionmaking by 
channeling lawmaking powers through fair and deliberative 
262 ld. at 103. 
263 ld. at 116. 
264 ld. 
265 ld. at 123 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
266 See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. 
267 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of 
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REV. 1373, 1414 (1978) ("Mow Sun 
Wong posits a right to procedural due process which requires that some legislative actions 
be undertaken only by a governmental entity which is so structured and so charged as to 
make possible a reflective determination that the action contemplated is fair, reasonable, 
and not at odds with specific prohibitions in the Constitution."). 
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procedures.268 Hampton, Rock Royal, Chenery, and Mow Sun 
Wong describe in general terms the types of procedural safeguards 
that would satisfy constitutional review.269 According to these 
cases, procedural due process is satisfied when administrative 
lawmaking involves a deliberative decisionmaking process leading 
to a publicly accessible, uniform legal rule (Wichita, Rock Royal, 
Chenery) that is supported by a reasoned justification rationally 
connected to statutory standards (Chenery, Mow Sun Wong). 
Panama Refining, Carter Coal, 270 and Mow Sun Wong explicitly 
locate these procedural requirements in the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause. 
Although the Court has yet to clarify precisely why the Fifth 
Amendment requires procedural safeguards in the administrative 
process, republican theory answers this question: administrative 
lawmaking procedures are necessary to prevent Congress from 
undermining the Constitution's republican ideals when it 
authorizes another body to make law outside of the legislative 
process's constitutional checks and balances. The Fifth 
Amendment addresses this problem by requiring Congress to 
prescribe procedures for administrative lawmaking that are 
adequate to ensure that such congressional delegations do not 
enhance the federal government's capacity for domination. 
Congress satisfies this standard when it channels administrative 
lawmaking through a "course of procedure"271 at least as protective 
of individual liberty as the checks and balances of Articles I and II. 
The APA's procedures for formal and informal rulemaking and 
formal adjudication further these republican ideals.272 In the rare 
contexts where Congress has required "formal," trial-type 
procedures for agency rulemaking or adjudication, the APA 
mandates that agencies hold closed-record hearings at which all 
interested parties are authorized to present evidence and, as 
268 See supra notes 234-43 and accompanying text. 
269 See supra notes 238--41, 248-67 and accompanying text. 
270 See supra notes 243-4 7 and accompanying text. 
271 Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922). 
272 See Pat McCarran, Foreward to ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, at iii (1947) (describing the APA as a "comprehensive charter of private liberty 
and a solemn undertaking of official fairness''). 
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necessary, engage in cross-examination.273 Similarly, the APA 
requires that agencies which participate in informal rulemaking 
must engage the public by publishing notice of proposed 
rulemaking actions and affording interested persons "an 
opportunity to participate in the [rulemaking] through submission 
of written data, views, or arguments."274 Agencies also must 
provide a reasoned explanation for their decisions to show that 
their final rules fall within the scope of their authority and are 
consistent with statutory standards. 275 When Congress channels 
delegated lawmaking authority through the APA's requirements 
or comparable procedural constraints, it curbs administrative 
domination by forcing agencies to 
operate within a set of legal rules (administrative law) 
that keep them within their jurisdiction, require them 
to operate with a modicum of explanation and 
participation of the affected interests, police them for 
consistency, and protect them from the importuning of 
congressmen and others who would like to carry 
logrolling into the administrative process. 276 
Deliberative administrative procedures like those in the AP A thus 
satisfy due process by honoring the republican values that are 
implicit in the Constitution's structure.277 Indeed, in a variety of 
contexts the APA's procedural requirements are plausibly far more 
effective in protecting the public from arbitrary lawmaking than 
the checks and balances outlined in Articles I and II. 278 When this 
21a 5 U.S.C. § 556(dHe) (2006). 
274 Id. § 553(bHc). 
276 Id. §§ 553(c), 557(c). 
276 Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Slwuld Make Political Decisions, 
1 J.L. ECON. & 0RG. 81, 99 (1985). 
277 This is not to say, of course, that the APA's procedural provisions could not be 
substantially different than they are. Congress is free to revise the APA:s procedures within 
the constraints of due process. 
278 See Davis, supra note 12, at 726 (''The courts should recognize that administrative 
legislation through the superb rule-making procedure marked out by the [APA) often 
provides better protection to private interests than congressional enactment of detail."). 
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is so, congressional delegation to administrative agencies may, 
counterintuitively, promote individual liberty. 
Because the APA generally satisfies the requirements of due 
process in administrative rulemaking, it should come as no 
surprise that the Court rarely has addressed the relationship 
between congressional delegation and administrative procedure 
since Congress enacted the APA in 1946. Although the Court has 
expressed skepticism about constitutionalizing administrative 
rulemaking procedures on some occasions, it also has affirmed the 
constitutional status of administrative procedures on others. For 
example, in its 1986 decision Bowen v. American Hospital 
Association,279 the Court observed that its acceptance of Congress's 
"need to vest administrative agencies with ample [lawmaking] 
power" had been premised on the "correlative responsibility of the 
agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its 
decision."280 More recently, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Jnc.,281 Justice Kennedy linked administrative procedure to 
nondelegation concerns in a concurring opinion in which he 
observed that the APA's requirements for reasoned 
decisionmaking "stem from the administrative agency's unique 
constitutional position."282 He explained that "[i]f agencies were 
permitted unbridled discretion, their actions might violate 
important constitutional principles of separation of powers and 
checks and balances."283 
In sum, administrative procedures safeguard the nondelegation 
doctrine's republican values by other means. In the legislative 
process, the bicameralism and presentment requirements of 
Articles I and II minimize the government's capacity for arbitrary 
legislation. In the same spirit, the Due Process Clause safeguards 
liberty in administrative lawmaking, as with other exercises of 
delegated authority, by requiring agencies to employ deliberative 
279 476 U.S. 610 (1986). 
2ao Id. at 627; see also Metzger, supra note 19, at 491-94 (describing the development of 
the Court's increasingly strict review of administrative decisionmaking). 
281 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). . 
282 Id. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
283 Id. 
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procedures that limit their capacity for arbitrariness. 284 Had 
Congress never enacted the AP A, in other words, due process 
would have compelled federal courts to require comparable 
procedural safeguards to honor the Constitution's republican 
ideals. 
C. STRUCTURAL DUE PROCESS 
Aside from substantive and procedural constraints, the Due 
Process Clause imposes additional structural constraints on 
Congress's authority to delegate lawmaking powers. For example, 
the Court has indicated that certain privatizations of legislative 
powers are "inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and 
duties of Congress"285 to the extent that nongovernmental 
regulators operate outside the chain of political accountability.286 
Although political accountability alone is not sufficient to conserve 
liberty,287 it is nonetheless a constitutional requirement for all 
delegations of federal lawmaking powers.288 
284 See 1 TRIBE, supra note 111, at 988 (observing that federal courts ''have . .. relied upon 
the procedural safeguards internal to agency decisionmaking" to address republican values 
central to nondelegation review because "such safeguards . .. protect 'against an arbitrary 
use' of delegated power" (quoting United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 576 
(1939))); cf. Edward Rubin, It's Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 111 (2003) (describing the APA's rulemaking 
procedures as "reiterat[ing], in a diluted and adapted form, the due process 
requirements . . . for adjudicatory decisions"). 
285 A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935). 
288 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (observing that delegation to 
private parties in this context is ''legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form" and that 
"a statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes an unconstitutional inference 
with personal liberty and private property''). Due process would not necessarily prevent 
Congress from authorizing private regulatory action or even requiring administrative 
agencies to consult private organizations when setting regulatory standards, provided that 
private actions do not enter into force without proper review and approval. See, e.g., Nat'l 
Ass'n of Regulating Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(suggesting the FCC could "invite[) [private parties] to conduct ... studies and, if 
warranted, to propose" standards which the "FCC ... retained its final authority'' to 
approve). 
287 See supra Part IV.B. 
288 See Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegations to 
Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 511 (2011) (arguing that the constitutional 
principle of political accountability should be understood to limit delegations of regulatory 
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Equally important, Congress must afford individuals adversely 
affected by agency action an opportunity for judicial review to 
enforce the substantive and procedural requirements of due 
process. 289 This structural component of the due process model 
has been embraced by federal judges in a number of decisions 
spanning the past two decades.290 For example, in South Dakota v. 
U.S. Department of the Interior,· the Eighth Circuit upheld a 
nondelegation challenge to the Secretary of the Interior's delegated 
authority to acquire commercial land in trust for the Lower Brule 
Tribe of Sioux Indians.291 In the course of its analysis, the court 
singled out for censure certain "procedural aspects" of the 
Secretary's statutory program, including the absence of judicial 
review to challenge procurement decisions. 292 Absent judicial 
authority to private parties). 
289 See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[T]he [nondelegation] doctrine ensures that courts charged 
with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test that 
exercise against ascertainable standards."); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that the requirement that the Legislature limit its grant of 
authority "prevents judicial review from becoming merely an exercise at. large by providing 
the courts with some measure against which to judge the official action that has been 
challenged"); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Connally, 337 
F. Supp. 737, 759 (D.D.C. 1971) (describing "[t]he safeguarding of meaningful judicial 
review" as "one of the primary functions" of the nondelegation doctrine). 
290 See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991) (Marshall, J ., concurring) 
(characterizing judicial review as a necessary ingredient to "perfect[] a delegated· 
lawmaking scheme by assuring that the exercise of [delegated] power remains within 
statutory bounds"); Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218 (1989) ("[S]o long as 
Congress provides an administrative agency with standards guiding its actions such that a 
court could 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,' no delegation of 
legislative authority trenching on the principle of separation of powers has occurred." 
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989))); South Dakota v. U.S. Dep't 
of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that Congress may not delegate 
lawmaking authority without providing an opportunity to reinforce constitutional 
constraints and to ensure that agencies stay within the limits of their authority), vacated on 
other grounds, 519 U.S. 919 (1996); United States v. Garfmkel, 29 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 
1994) ("[J]udicial review is a factor weighing in favor of upholding a statute against a 
nondelegation challenge." (quoting United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 
1992) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative 
powers broadly and courts have upheld such delegation because there is court review to 
assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits .. . . "). 
291 69 F. 3d at 880, 885. 
292 ld. at 884-85. 
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review, the court argued, such congressional delegation would 
create "an agency fiefdom" characterized by the "exercise of 
unrestrained power."293 Because the Secretary's statutory authority 
was not subject to any meaningful judicial check, it violated the 
nondelegation doctrine. 294 
The constitutional link between delegation and judicial review 
has not gone unchallenged, however. Prior to the Eighth Circuit's 
decision in South Dakota, the Ninth Circuit had reached precisely 
the opposite conclusion, holding that Congress could withhold 
judicial review of administrative lawmaking without transgressing 
the nondelegation doctrine. 295 This circuit split attracted the 
Court's attention when the Department of the Interior filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari in South Dakota.296 In an eleventh-
hour gambit to avoid Court review, the Department ultimately 
conceded the reviewability of procurement decisions under the 
delegation at issue, 297 prompting the Court to grant the petition for 
certiorari and summarily vacate and remand the case to the 
Eighth Circuit with instructions to remand the matter to the 
Secretary of the Interior for reconsideration. 298 This turn of events 
did not, however, put an end to the underlying controversy 
regarding the necessity of judicial review to ensure a 
constitutional delegation. In a dissent from the Court's summary 
decision, three Justices-Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas-took the 
Eighth Circuit to task, protesting that they could not "see how the 
availability of judicial review has anything to do with" the 
constitutional validity of a congressional delegation.299 
Despite the dissent's protestations to the contrary, the 
availability of judicial reVIew Is plainly integral to the 
293 ld. at 885. 
294 ld. 
295 See, e.g., United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the 
"availability of judicial review" of congressional delegations as "a factor weighing in favor of 
upholding a statute against a nondelegation challenge," but rejecting "the proposition that 
judicial review is always constitutionally required"). 
296 Dep't of the Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919, 919 (1996). 
297 ld. at 920-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
298 ld. at 919. 
'299 Id. at 921-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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constitutionality of congressional delegations. Even under the 
traditional nondelegation doctrine, judicial review is necessary to 
prevent wholly standardless delegations and ultra vires 
administrative action. 300 When considered from a due process 
perspective, any argument for decoupling congressional delegation 
from judicial review is even less persuasive. The Due Process 
Clause's substantive and procedural constraints on congressional 
delegation would be largely meaningless in practice if 
administrative agencies could sidestep those constraints without 
legal review or repercussions. At a minimum, federal courts must 
be able to review "whether the [delegate]'s action falls within [its] 
delegated authority, whether the statutory language has been 
properly construed, and whether the [delegate's] action conforms 
with the relevant procedural requirements."30l The due process 
model thus lends support to the Eighth Circuit's conclusion in 
South Dakota that access to judicial review is an essential 
component of any constitutionally valid delegation of congressional 
lawmaking power.ao2 
In the past, a number of legal scholars have argued that 
rigorous rationality review, commonly referred to as "hard look" 
review, is also necessary to safeguard the public from arbitrary 
administrative lawmaking.303 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
300 See Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and Judicial Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 
73, 78 (2010) (arguing that ultra vires action by executive agencies without judicial review 
is unconstitutional); see also Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking and the American Constitution 
11 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
1485020, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485020 
(examining the role of executive oversight of agency rulemaking in light of the 
constitutionally required checks and balances). 
301 Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also 
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (observing that 
"[c]ourts remain obligated to determine whether statutory restrictions [on delegated 
authority] have been violated"). 
302 See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text. 
303 See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an 
Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 440--47 (2003) (examining the 
increasingly important role of judicial review as a check on the excessive use of 
administrative authority and identifying hard look review as "necessary to enforce 
[republican] ideals"); see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of 
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 768 (advocating "arbitrariness review'' as a 
"surrogate safeguard[] for the decline of constitutional checks on agency authority''). 
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Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.,304 the Court endorsed the hard look standard when 
it held that agency rules would be deemed arbitrary and capricious 
under the AP A 
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has 
not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise. 305 
The due process model is consistent with hard look review insofar 
as it ensures that agencies honor statutory guidelines and furnish 
reasoned justifications for their actions. The deliberative process 
contemplated under hard look review, as under the due process 
model, advances republican values by enmeshing administrative 
lawmaking within constraints that are roughly equivalent to the 
checks and balances of Articles I and II. Hard look review, 
specifically, "acknowledges the unique constitutional position of 
agencies outside the tripartite system of government envisioned by 
the Framers, and compensates through heightened scrutiny of 
agency decisions in the form of the requirement that agencies give 
adequate reasons."306 While hard look review might increase the 
costs of rulemaking307 and raise concerns about political bias in 
304 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
305 Id. at 43. 
306 Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: 
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 387, 440. 
307 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419, 1444 (1992) (describing hard look review as "extremely resource-
intensive"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of 
Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 72 (1997) (same). But see Jason Webb 
Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is 
Federal Rule-making "Ossified"?, 19 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261, 261 (2010) (offering 
an empirical study that challenges the ossification thesis). 
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judicial decisionmaking,308 these weaknesses are "the price we pay 
for delegating highly complex important public policy decisions to 
unelected administrative agencies."309 The best response to these 
concerns is for federal judges to exercise prudential self-restraint 
by using hard look review to ensure "that agencies do their 
homework, not that agencies arrive at the correct answer."310 
Applied in this manner, hard look review will be less dominating 
than unchecked administrative discretion. The due process 
account of hard look review thus resonates with the mainstream 
republican vision of courts as indispensible checks against 
executive and legislative domination.311 
In sum, the due process model envisions a constitutionally 
grounded role for judicial review of congressional delegations. 
3os See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 303, at 765 (stating that some people "fear that 
judicial biases play a large role in the operation of the hard look doctrine"). 
309 William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal 
Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393, 444 (2000). 
310 Bressman, supra note 26, at 548. 
311 See Dawood, supra note 32, at 1418 (arguing that judicial review promotes republican 
values by "prevent[ing] the most dominating legislative action with judicial intervention 
that is the least dominating''). Republicans generally accept that judicial review is 
necessary to ensure that the procedures by which the public interest is protected are not 
distorted by domination. See, e.g., id. at 1416 (arguing that courts should "minimize the 
illegitimate exercise of power by public officials in democratic design, without [becoming 
involved themselves] too deeply in determining what that design should be"); Iseult 
Honohan, Republicans, Rights, and Constitutions: Is Judicial Review Compatible with 
Republican Self-Government?, in LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, supra note 29, at 100-01 (arguing 
that strong judicial review can help realize republican non-domination); Horacio Spector, 
Judicial Review, Rights, and Democracy, 22 LAw & PHIL. 285, 295 (2003) (explaining that 
the implications of moral rights justify judicial review). But see RICHARD BELLAMY, 
POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
DEMOCRACY 163-64 (2007) (arguing that judicial review is inadequate from a republican 
perspective because constitutional courts exercise unbridled lawmaking power). 
To the extent that federal legislation expressly precludes judicial review of 
administrative lawmaking, courts should construe such statutes narrowly to permit judicial 
review for due process issues as well as constitutional issues implicating separation of 
powers and delegation questions. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (''We do not 
think [the statutory provision precluding judicial review) may be read to exclude review of 
constitutional claims."); Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 780-81 (1985) 
(statutory language did not prevent review of whether there had been " 'a substantial 
departure from important procedural rights' " or ''like error 'going to the heart of the 
administrative determination' " (quoting Scroggins v. United States, 397 F.2d 295, 297 
(1968))). 
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Pursuant to the anti-inherency principle, courts may overturn 
agency regulations that exceed the scope of congressionally 
authorized authority. Courts also may intervene if Congress has 
not prescribed an intelligible principle to guide agency action or if 
Congress has failed to pair such a substantive standard with fair 
and deliberative administrative procedures, political 
accountability, and judicial review. To ensure that judicial review 
does not undermine liberty, courts ordinarily should afford 
Congress a healthy margin of deference when evaluating whether 
congressionally mandated substantive standards, administrative 
procedures, and structural constraints satisfy due process. They 
should not manufacture substantive standards where Congress 
has not done so, nor should they impose procedural requirements 
on agencies beyond the basic due process requirements of reasoned 
deliberation and justification. Only where administrative 
procedures are manifestly inadequate to compensate for 
Congress's circumvention of constitutional checks and balances 
through the delegation may courts intervene to prevent 
administrative lawmaking from "running riot."312 Under this 
deferential approach, judicial review of congressional delegations 
would honor the Constitution's republican ideals. 
D. DUE PROCESS AND ORDERED LIBERTY 
As developed in the foregoing discussion, the due process model 
promotes the Constitution's republican design by conserving 
liberty in the administrative state. While reasonable minds might 
disagree about which particular safeguards are necessary to 
safeguard individual liberty when Congress entrusts lawmaking 
powers to administrative agencies, the three-part due process 
model outlined in the preceding sections best captures the Court's 
answer to these republican concerns. 
This due process model is superior to both the traditional 
nondelegation doctrine and the current delegation doctrine 
because it allows Congress to harvest the benefits of broad 
delegation while checking the attendant threats to individual 
31 2 A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935). 
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liberty. Like the traditional nondelegation doctrine, the due 
process model takes seriously the republican values embodied in 
constitutional checks and balances, but it does not require 
Congress to make every meaningful policy decision within those 
bounds. Instead, the due process model reconciles administrative 
lawmaking with the Constitution's republican design by requiring 
Congress to establish a minimalist substantive standard, 
combined with administrative procedures and judicial review to 
further limit potential agency arbitrariness. This approach is 
more principled than the traditional nondelegation doctrine 
because it sidesteps the dubious proposition that Congress does 
not delegate legislative powers to administrative agencies. 313 It 
also clarifies why congressional delegations need only establish an 
intelligible principle rather than a fully determinate criterion to 
pass constitutional muster at a substantiallevel.314 
For similar reasons, the due process model is vastly superior to 
the new nondelegation doctrine. 315 Both the new nondelegation 
doctrine and the due process model support the principle that 
federal agencies lack inherent authority to make law absent a 
delegation from Congress through legislation or from the President 
through subdelegation. The due process model is less susceptible 
to judicial domination than the new nondelegation doctrine, 
however, because it does not deputize courts to narrow broad 
congressional delegations through canons of statutory 
interpretation.316 The due process model leaves the responsibility 
to establish an intelligible principle where it belongs: with 
Congress and the President, subject to the checks and balances of 
Articles I and II. The Judicial Branch's role, in contrast, is limited 
to evaluating whether Congress has established (1) an intelligible 
principle, (2) fair and deliberative administrative procedures, and 
(3) structural constraints such as political accountability and 
judicial review. 
313 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1721. 
314 See supra Part III. c. 
315 See supra Part III.B. 
316 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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The due process model complements the emerging delegation 
doctrine insofar as both accept that Congress may entrust broad 
lawmaking discretion to administrative agencies without 
transgressing separation of powers principles. The problem with 
the existing delegation doctrine, taken alone, is that it does not 
adequately address the federal government's increased capacity for 
arbitrariness when Congress delegates broad lawmaking powers to 
the Executive Branch. The due process model fills this gap by 
embedding executive lawmaking within a framework of 
substantive, procedural, and structural constraints that honor the 
Constitution's commitment to ordered liberty. To be sure, due 
process constraints differ in important respects from the checks 
and balances of Articles I or II, and these differences may produce 
some functional asymmetries in practice. Nonetheless, the general 
objective of both legislative checks and balances and the Due 
Process Clause's substantive, procedural, and structural 
safeguards are one and the same: to safeguard the public from 
domination. The due process model's basic requirements thus 
preserve central features of the emerging delegation doctrine while 
better honoring the checks and balances of Articles I and II. 
Because the due process model operates primarily to reinforce 
legislative checks and balances-the constitutional architecture of 
ordered liberty-it offers protection for a broad range of interests 
in administrative rulemaking. To qualify for relief under the Due 
Process Clause, plaintiffs must show that they face a deprivation 
of "life, liberty, or property."317 Challenges to agency rulemaking 
based on property interests will be somewhat limited because 
prospective plaintiffs will have to demonstrate a concrete legal 
entitlement; the mere unilateral expectation or hope of a future 
property interest is insufficient. 318 Constitutional liberty interests 
offer a broader scope for due process challenges to administrative 
rulemaking. The Court has recognized that "[i]n a Constitution for 
317 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
318 See Bd. of Regents of State Colis. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (''To have a property 
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for 
it."). 
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a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' 
must be broad indeed."319 Hence, liberty 
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but 
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of 
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized ... as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.a2o 
Whenever agencies categorically exclude individuals from future 
opportunities as a matter of law, such action could constitute a 
liberty deprivation triggering due process protection.321 Thus, 
administrative agencies cannot adopt regulations depriving 
individuals of property or barring access to a variety of present or 
future opportunities without triggering the full substantive, 
procedural, and structural safeguards of due process. 
Critics will no doubt object that the due process model gives 
courts too much power to tinker with administrative procedure, 
raising concerns that agency rulemaking will grind to a halt under 
the weight of new procedural requirements. In theory, due process 
review could ossify administrative lawmaking if federal courts 
impose unduly onerous procedural requirements. Alternatively, 
agencies might overcompensate by employing unduly onerous 
administrative procedures out of an unjustified fear of judicial 
vacatur. 
While such concerns must be taken seriously, they should not 
be exaggerated. Due process review would not grant to the federal 
courts a "roving commission to inquire into evils and then, upon 
discovering them," authorize the courts to manufacture new 
319 Id. at 572. 
320 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
321 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74 (holding that an applicant for state employment lacked a 
liberty interest, but noting that it "would be a different case" if the state invoked 
"regulations to bar the [applicant]" from all future employment opportunities in all public 
state universities). 
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administrative procedures out of whole cloth.322 Rather, the due 
process model authorizes judicial intervention into administrative 
lawmaking procedure only under very limited circumstances. 
Plaintiffs challenging administrative lawmaking would have to 
establish that Congress failed to furnish an intelligible principle, 
that the agency did not employ minimally fair and deliberative 
procedures culminating in a reasoned decision, or that the agency 
was not subject to essential structural safeguards such as political 
accountability and judicial review. Absent a clear departure from 
these constitutional requirements, courts have to defer to 
Congress's assessment regarding how much administrative 
discretion is necessary to accomplish a particular regulatory 
purpose. The due process model thus envisions a relatively modest 
role for judicial review of congressional delegations--<>ne that 
preserves the constitutional prerogatives of Congress and the 
Executive Branch, while protecting republican values and avoiding 
the pitfalls of unconstrained administrative lawmaking. 
V. PU'ITING THE DUE PROCESS MODEL INTO PRACTICE 
If federal administrative law already satisfies the due process 
model in many essential respects, some might wonder whether the 
move from nondelegation to due process would accomplish 
anything more than simply reaffirming the constitutionality of 
current federal law. In short, does it make a difference in practice 
whether federal courts apply the traditional nondelegation 
doctrine, the new nondelegation doctrine, or the due process 
model? This Part seeks to clarify the due process model's 
transformative potential by briefly highlighting several areas in 
which due process principles could significantly impact judicial 
review of congressional delegations in theory and practice. 
322 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 435 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). The due 
process model thus contemplates a far narrower role for judicial review than Davis's theory 
of administrative common law, which envisioned federal courts exercising sweeping powers 
to "determine what discretionary power is necessary and what is unnecessary'' and to 
design administrative procedures to curb unnecessary discretionary power. KENNETH CULP 
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 50-51 (1969). 
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A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
One important implication of the due process model is that 
ordinary federal administrative procedure assumes a 
constitutional stature. If the AP A did not exist, the Fifth 
Amendment would require federal agencies to develop comparable 
procedural requirements to safeguard the public from 
administrative domination. More importantly for present 
purposes, to the extent that the APA does not currently satisfy due 
process, delegations of lawmaking authority thereunder cannot 
withstand judicial review. The due process model thus clarifies 
the limits of the Court's holding in Bi-Metallic:323 although 
individuals do not have a constitutional right to individualized 
notice and a hearing in generalized rule making proceedings, 324 
Congress must nonetheless satisfy the basic procedural 
requirements of due process whenever it entrusts agencies with 
lawmaking authority. 325 In particular, due process requires that 
Congress constrain administrative lawmaking with intelligible 
statutory principles, fair and deliberative procedures, basic 
political accountability, and judicial review. 
These implications of the due process model challenge current 
administrative law orthodoxy. As discussed previously, most legal 
scholars have construed Bi-Metallic to hold that due process has 
no application whatsoever to administrative rulemaking.326 
Moreover, ever since the Court's landmark 1978 decision Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 327 the prevailing sentiment has been that administrative 
323 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445--46 (1915). 
324 See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text. 
325 See supra Part N .B. 
326 See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text. 
327 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Before Vermont Yankee, the D.C. Circuit had taken steps toward 
creating a federal common law of administrative procedure. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 
491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (suggesting that oral proceedings, cross-examination, and 
notice-and-comment procedures may all be necessary); Portland Cement Ass'n v. 
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring elaborate statements of 
technical information in notices of proposed rulemaking), superseded on other grounds by 15 
U.S.C. § 793(c)(1), as recognized in Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1042 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999). Vermont Yankee put an end to this movement. See 435 U.S. at 525 (faulting the 
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rulemaking procedure is the exclusive province of Congress.328 
The due process model advanced in this Article, on the other hand, 
counsels a narrower reading of Bi-Metallic and Vermont Yankee. 
While Bi-Metallic held that individuals do not have a 
constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to participate 
directly in agency rulemaking, it did not suggest that the 
Constitution would permit Congress to dispense with 
administrative procedure altogether when entrusting generalized 
rulemaking powers to federal agencies. Neither did Vermont 
Yankee go so far. To the contrary, the opening paragraph of 
Vermont Yankee acknowledged that there could be some 
circumstances, however rare, that would "justify a court in 
overturning agency action because of a failure to employ 
procedures beyond those required by ... statute."329 Because the 
Court considered it unnecessary to reach that issue in Vermont 
Yankee, it expressly reserved for future consideration whether, or 
under what circumstances, the Constitution might require 
agencies to employ more-robust rulemaking procedures than those 
outlined in the AP A and other federal legislation. 330 
The due process model fills the gap left behind in Bi-Metallic 
and Vermont Yankee by clarifying the relationship between the 
Constitution and the AP A. Administrative procedure and due 
process are fundamentally intertwined because the AP A addresses 
domination concerns that would otherwise compromise the 
Constitution's republican ideals.331 Ordinarily, courts may not 
D.C. Circuit for "seriously misread[ing] ... statutory and decisional law" by developing 
common law administrative procedures to supplement the APA). 
328 See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.14, at 204 (3d ed. 1991} ("(T]he 
Court meant exactly what it said in Vermont Yankee: that courts may not impose 
rulemaking procedural requirements beyond those specified by statute."). 
329 435 U.S. at 524. 
330 See id. at 542-43 (observing simply that agencies need not employ rulemaking 
procedures more stringent than those prescribed in the APA "(a]bsent constitutional 
constraints or extremely compelling circumstances"); cf Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 
660 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that there may be some circumstances in which agency 
standard-setting could satisfy the APA but not the Fifth Amendment). 
331 See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 660-61 (noting the interplay between the APA and the Fifth 
Amendment); Bressman, supra note 26, at 472 (noting that the purpose of the APA is "to 
guard against overreaching or unfair regulation by providing affected parties increased 
hearing and participation rights"); Mashaw, supra note 128, at 507 ("Agency hearing 
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impose administrative procedures beyond those identified in the 
APA because they have no inherent authority to develop 
administrative common law in the absence of a constitutional 
requirement332 and because the AP A easily satisfies the demands 
of procedural due process. 333 For example, when agencies employ 
traditional "notice-and-comment" rulemaking under the APA, 334 
petitioners will rarely, if ever, be able to demonstrate that an 
agency has not satisfied due process. Consistent with the AP A, 
due process also should be understood to permit interim final 
rulemaking-postponing notice-and-comment until after a rule has 
entered into force--in emergencies and other circumstances where 
"good cause" would support such action.335 In some contexts, the 
interest-balancing logic of contemporary due process analysis336 
might even permit an agency to dispense with notice-and-comment 
procedures altogether, such as where disclosure of an agency's 
action would pose a grave and imminent threat to national 
security. 337 On the other hand, due process might occasionally 
processes ... must satisfy constitutional due process requirements."); Metzger, supra note 
19, at 489-92 (suggesting that administrative law development and increased judicial 
scrutiny of these delegations are defined, in part, by constitutional concerns). 
332 See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 ("Agencies are free to grant additional procedural 
rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to 
impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them."). 
333 See supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text. 
334 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006) ("After notice required by this section, the agency shall 
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the [rulemaking] through 
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral 
presentation."). 
335 See Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendation 95-4, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 43,108, 43,112-13 (Aug. 18, 1995) (recommending that interim final rulemaking be 
employed for rules adopted under the "impracticable" and "public interest" tests); cf 
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1991) (holding that a state statute authorizing 
prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing violated due process 
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances). 
336 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (explaining that due process has 
been recognized by the Court on many occasions as "not a technical conception with a fixed 
content" but a "flexible" process that "calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
337 See Richard J. Pierce, Presidential Control Is Better than the Alternatives, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. SEE ALSO 113, 120 (2010), http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/vol/88/responses/pierce 
(asserting that requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking for a Department of Defense 
directive setting standards for permissible collateral damage to civilians in armed conflict 
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require more robust procedures than the APA currently mandates. 
For instance, some of the APA's categorical exemptions for notice-
and-comment rulemaking could violate due process to the extent 
that they allow administrative agencies to make federal law 
without engaging in an adequately fair and deliberative decision-
making process and without any showing of good cause. 338 To the 
extent that loopholes in the APA increase the federal government's 
capacity for arbitrariness, they also constitute an unconstitutional 
threat to individual liberty under the Due Process Clause. 
B. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The due process model also reinforces key features of the 
Chevron doctrine, which dictates the general circumstances under 
which courts must defer to federal agencies' interpretations of 
ambiguous federal statutes.339 In Chevron, the Court held that 
courts ordinarily should allow administrative agencies to fill gaps 
and clarify ambiguities in statutes based on Congress's presumed 
intent to delegate interpretive power, the Executive Branch's 
superior political responsiveness and accountability, and agencies' 
superior expertise and capacity for robust deliberation.340 The 
primary limitation on Chevron deference is that it applies only in 
contexts where courts can reasonably infer that Congress intended 
to delegate interpretive discretion to the agency.341 If it appears 
could have disastrous consequences). 
338 See generally Evan J. Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 
Nw. U. L. REV. 1271 (2010) (arguing that the APA's exemptions for foreign affairs and 
military functions should be eliminated in favor of the general good cause exemption). 
339 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984) (upholding any non-arbitrary and capricious interpretation of an ambiguous statute). 
340 Id. at 865-66. Where Chevron deference applies, agencies may experiment with 
different statutory interpretations over time, provided that their interpretations are 
reasonable. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
982-83 (2005) (holding that stare decisis does not apply with the same force to agency 
interpretations under Chevron). 
34! See, e.g. , Ronald J . Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency 
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737 (2002) 
(explaining that the Court has stated that "unless Congress delegates formal lawmaking 
power to an agency, the agency's work product, in whatever form, does not merit Chevron 
deference"). 
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that Congress would not have intended to delegate interpretive 
authority, courts must evaluate the agency's statutory 
interpretation under a formally less deferential standard.342 
The due process model supports Meacfs controversial gloss on 
the Chevron doctrine, but it suggests that Mead might have more 
to do with due process than actual congressional intent. According 
to Mead, Chevron deference does not apply unless Congress has 
required "relatively formal administrative procedure tending to 
foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force."343 Notice-and-comment rulemaking 
is one example of a procedural form that would satisfy this 
requirement, but it is not the only one; a formal agency 
pronouncement reflecting "careful consideration ... over a long 
period of time" also may qualify for Chevron deference. 344 In 
addition, whatever process an agency employs, Chevron applies 
only where administrative lawmaking leads to a uniform 
regulatory standard. 345 While courts have attributed these 
requirements to congressional intent, the due process model 
suggests a more nuanced explanation: federal courts will not 
recognize Congress as having delegated authority to an agency 
unless the agency has developed its statutory interpretation 
through a relatively formal, deliberative process that satisfies due 
342 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) ("The weight accorded to an 
administrative judgment [in a particular case] 'will depend upon the thoroughness evident 
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.'" (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))). 
343 Id. at 230; see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173 (2007) 
(applying Chevron deference where an agency employed full public notice-and-comment 
procedures); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (reasoning that the EPA Administrator's statutory 
interpretation was "entitled to deference," in part, because "the agency considered the 
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion"). 
344 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). 
345 See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 232-33; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 
478--80, 482 (1999) (denying Chevron deference where a statute was administered by 
multiple federal agencies); cf People ex rel. Gamber v. Sholem, 128 N.E. 377, 379-80 (Ill. 
1920) (invoking the nondelegation doctrine to strike down a state law authorizing 
condemnation of buildings liable to catch fire because the law would have subjected 
property owners "to the varying opinions of the different fire marshals in the several 
localities"). 
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process. This approach reframes Mead as a constitutional-
avoidance gloss on the Chevron doctrine. 346 
Mead, in turn, confirms and clarifies the types of administrative 
procedure that would satisfy due process. According to Mead, 
federal agencies may exercise delegated lawmaking powers only 
through "a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to 
foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force."347 This standard is consistent with 
the Court's instruction in cases from Wichita to Mow Sun Wong348 
that administrative lawmaking is constitutional only if it is 
channeled through fair and deliberative procedures.349 Agencies 
may not, therefore, exercise delegated lawmaking powers through 
informal agency reports, memoranda, or letters that do not reflect 
the level of rigorous institutional review required by procedural 
due process.350 To satisfy due process, agencies must identify the 
346 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 538 (arguing that Mead stands for the proposition 
that "[a]gencies may possess only so much authority (1) as Congress may grant them, and 
(2) as they may exercise consistent with the values of fairness, rationality, and 
predictability"). 
347 Mead, 533 U.S. at 230; see also Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222 (explaining that "whether a 
court should give [Chevron] deference depends in significant part upon the interpretive 
method used" and deferring to the agency based, in part, on the "careful consideration the 
Agency has given the question over a long period of time"); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2007) (giving Chevron deference 
because "the formality .. . require[d] for policy statements" under the Endangered Species 
Act "is indistinguishable from notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA"); Alaska 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 424 F.3d 931, 939 
(9th Cir. 2005) (according Chevron deference based on a federal agency's "formal 
administrative process"). 
348 See supra Part IV.B. 
349 See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (stating that Fifth 
Amendment claim requires inquiry into whether "essential procedures have been followed"); 
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 576 (1939) ("Even though procedural 
safeguards cannot validate an unconstitutional delegation, they do furnish protection 
against an arbitrary use of properly delegated authority."); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405 (1928) (stating that before a conclusion is reasoned "the 
[agency] must make an investigation, and in doing so must give notice to all parties 
interested and an opportunity to adduce evidence and to be heard"); Wichita R.R. & Light 
Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922) ("[A]n agency must pursue the 
procedure and rules enjoined, and show a substantial compliance therewith to give validity 
to its action."). 
350 See, e.g., Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(declining to accord preemptive effect to agency letters that were "not the product of some 
HeinOnline  -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 196 2011-2012
196 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:117 
statutory or treaty delegation and the particular factors that 
trigger their administrative authority,35l and they must explain 
how their actions represent a reasonable exercise of 
congressionally delegated authority. 352 Ultimately, agency 
lawmaking must lead to a coherent and consistent legal standard. 
In each of these respects, cases like Mead can be viewed from a 
due process perspective as demarcating the constitutional limits of 
Chevron deference. 
C. AGENCY SELF-REGULATION 
A third area where the due process model could inform federal 
administrative law is agency self-regulation. Prior to American 
Trucking, some legal scholars argued that courts should allow 
administrative agencies to narrow unconstitutionally broad 
congressional delegations by establishing substantive standards to 
limit their own discretion.353 The Court soundly rejected this 
position, however, in American Trucking.354 Just as federal courts 
cannot cure unconstitutional delegations by supplying intelligible 
principles of their own design,355 agency self-regulation does not 
adequately address the problem of unfettered administrative 
agency authority. The problem, as the Court recognized, is that an 
administrative agency's "choice of which portion of [Congress's 
delegated] power to exercise ... would itself be an exercise of 
form of agency proceeding''); Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1243 (lOth Cir. 2003) 
(denying Chevron deference to actions taken in informal agency reports and memoranda). 
35t See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947) (noting that a court should not 
have to "guess" the authority behind an agency's actions); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388, 432 (1935) (stating that due process requires the agency's actions to fall within its 
statutory authority). 
352 Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (listing reasonableness factors for APA hard look review), with Mow Sun Wong, 426 
U.S. at 103 ("[D]ue process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the 
[agency] rule was actually intended to serve [a proper] interest."). 
363 DAVIS, supra note 322, at 4&-49; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the 
Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J . 1399, 1418 
(2000). 
354 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001). 
355 See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
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[unchecked] legislative authority."356 If Congress does not provide 
an intelligible principle to guide agency discretion at the outset, 
principles of procedural and structural due process are ineffectual 
as safeguards against administrative arbitrariness because 
agencies, like courts, lack an independent standard against which 
to evaluate their actions. Although agency self-regulation might 
be desirable from a republican perspective to limit arbitrariness 
downstream at the adjudication stage, it does not fully address the 
domination concerns that arise when Congress delegates 
unfettered lawmaking authority to an agency at the rulemaking 
stage. An agency cannot, therefore, "cure an unlawful delegation 
of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting 
construction of the statute."357 
On the other hand, agency self-regulation may remedy 
Congress's failure to prescribe appropriate administrative 
procedures. Procedural due process asks whether an agency has 
engaged in a fair and deliberative process leading to a rational 
explanation of the legal and factual basis for the agency's action. 358 
When courts conduct this inquiry, it should make little difference 
whether an agency's procedures derive from the APA, other federal 
legislation, or administrative self-regulation. Although agencies 
cannot exercise delegated lawmaking powers without employing 
minimally fair and deliberative procedures, Congress need not be 
the one to establish those procedures. As long as an agency's 
lawmaking procedures satisfy the minimum requirements of due 
process, congressional delegation does not lead to domination.359 
356 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 473. 
357 ld. at 472. 
358 See supra Part IV.B. 
359 Of course, the mere fact that agency regulations are characterized as "procedural" does 
not mean that they are foreclosed from having significant effects upon substantive law. See 
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 
YALE L.J. 1063, 1068 (1980) (''That the subject in all these cases is procedure, however, is 
not to say that the meaning and purpose of the Constitution's prescriptions on each subject 
are themselves merely procedural."). To address broader domination concerns, agency 
procedures should operate evenhandedly in practice, promoting reasoned deliberation and 
justification, rather than systematically empowering or disempowering particular groups or 
individuals. 
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The due process model thus suggests that administrative 
agencies may cure procedural defects in congressional delegations 
by binding themselves prospectively to employ fair and 
deliberative lawmaking procedures. As recognized in American 
Trucking, however, no amount of agency self-regulation, no matter 
how well-intentioned, can compensate for Congress's failure to 
establish a substantive intelligible principle to constrain agency 
discretion. 360 
D. DELEGATION TO THE PRESIDENT 
Yet another area where the due process model could introduce 
changes to current federal law is congressional delegation to the 
President. From the nondelegation doctrine's earliest days, 
federal courts have applied the doctrine to delegations augmenting 
presidential power.361 Both Panama Refining and Schechter 
Poultry featured congressional delegations to the President, and 
the Court took pains in both cases to emphasize the dearth of 
administrative procedure in the President's decisionmaking 
process.362 Nonetheless, in recent years federal courts have been 
reluctant to subject the President's exercise of delegated 
lawmaking authority to the same procedural and structural 
requirements that govern ordinary administrative lawmaking. 
The leading case in this area is Franklin v. Massachusetts, 363 
where the Court held that the AP A does not authorize judicial 
review of presidential action. 364 Although the Court recognized 
that "[t]he President is not explicitly excluded from the APA's 
purview," it stressed that "he is not explicitly included, either," 
and expressed concern that extending administrative procedure to 
presidential action could implicate "separation of powers and the 
360 531 U.S. at 905. 
361 See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680-83 (1892) (reviewing a delegation 
to the President and citing the earlier similar case of The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
382 (1813)) . 
362 See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text. 
363 505 u.s. 788 (1992). 
364 Id. at 800-01. 
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unique constitutional position of the President."365 In the absence 
of a particularly clear statement from Congress, the Court 
reasoned that it should not construe the APA to limit presidential 
lawmaking.366 The Court thus construed the APA to categorically 
exempt presidential lawmaking from the ordinary requirements of 
administrative procedure. 367 
Viewed from a republican perspective, the prospect of 
procedurally unfettered presidential lawmaking is deeply 
troubling. Although the Court in Franklin argued that separation 
of powers principles counseled judicial restraint, the Court failed 
to consider the degree to which its decision would undermine the 
same republican ideals that constitutional checks and balances 
were designed to advance. By exempting presidential action from 
administrative procedure and seemingly allowing the Executive 
Branch to make law unilaterally outside the checks and balances 
of Articles I and II, the Court dramatically expanded the federal 
government's capacity for arbitrariness. Indeed, the Court cited 
precisely these republican concerns six years later in Clinton u. 
City of New York when it held that the presidential line-item veto 
was unconstitutional.368 Although the Court did not acknowledge 
the close symmetry between the two cases, Clinton effectively 
exposed the frailty of Franklin's constitutional logic: Congress 
could not commit procedurally unfettered, unilateral lawmaking 
authority to the Executive Branch because such action would 
"enhance[ ] the President's powers beyond what the Framers 
would have endorsed."369 
To reconcile congressional delegation with the Constitution's 
republican structure, due process requires that Congress "enjoin 
upon" the President, like all other delegates, "a certain course of 
procedure"-one that will mitigate the threats to liberty associated 
with Congress's circumvention of constitutional checks and 
365 Id. at 800. 
366 Id. at 801. 
367 ld. 
368 524 u.s. 417, 448-49 (1998). 
369 Id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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balances.370 Ideally, Congress could fill this gap by imposing 
general-framework legislation for presidential administrative 
procedure371 or specific procedures tailored to specific 
congressional delegations. The President also could address 
domination concerns by committing the White House to follow 
deliberative procedures such as providing notice and an 
opportunity for public comment in presidential rulemaking where 
exceptional circumstances would not require a different approach. 
Alternatively, the Court could acknowledge Franklin's shaky 
reasoning and reinterpret the AP A to cover presidential 
lawmaking when the President exercises congressionally delegated 
authority.372 Whether such procedures derive from the APA, other 
federal legislation, or presidential self-regulation, due process 
requires an opportunity for judicial review to ensure that the 
President has not exceeded the scope of his congressionally 
delegated authority and has complied with applicable substantive 
and procedural constraints. Such measures would fortify 
congressional delegations against the constitutional difficulties 
that doomed the line-item veto in Clinton. 373 
To be clear, the Constitution does not obligate the White House 
to use notice-and-comment rulemaking (or its functional 
equivalent) for all exercises of lawmaking authority. In areas such 
as military discipline, where the Constitution vests the President 
with independent lawmaking authority, the President may 
exercise procedurally unfettered power without undermining 
370 Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922). 
371 See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 123, 154 (1994) (arguing that "we must evaluate twentieth-century 
congressional framework legislation in light of the great twentieth-century giveaway of 
legislative power"). 
372 This approach would not be difficult to square with the text of the APA; indeed, 
subjecting presidential action to APA procedure is arguably more consistent with the 
statute's plain language than Franklin's more attenuated, prudential reading. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 551(1) (2006) (defining "agency" as "each authority of the Government of the United 
States" except "(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the governments of 
the territories or possessions of the United States; (D) the government of the District of 
Columbia"). 
373 See 524 U.S. at 449 ("[T]he procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not 
authorized by the Constitution."). 
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constitutional checks and balances. 374 Due process also would 
permit the President to dispense with APA-style deliberative 
procedures where such procedures are "impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."375 Indeed, it is 
entirely possible that most presidential lawmaking would qualify 
for special treatment under one or both of these exceptions. 
Nonetheless, concluding that the Constitution permits Congress to 
exempt all congressional delegations to the President from 
deliberative procedure would be a mistake. If this were the case, 
Congress could make an end-run around the Constitution's liberty-
promoting checks and balances by committing all administrative 
rulemaking authority to the President. This result is unacceptable 
from a republican perspective because it would do violence to the 
Constitution's structure. As the Court explained in Panama 
Refining, the requirements of deliberative administrative 
procedure represent " 'general principles of constitutional 
government.' We cannot regard the President as immune from the 
application of these constitutional principles."376 
E. DELEGATING FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS 
In one area of federal regulation, Congress has conspicuously 
circumvented the checks and balances of Articles I and II without 
recognizing any constraints on its authority to delegate lawmaking 
power. That area is foreign affairs. Ever since the Court's 
landmark 1936 decision United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp.,377 federal courts have given Congress a wide birth when it 
entrusts lawmaking power to the Executive in foreign affairs. 378 
374 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; supra Part II.D. 
375 5 u.s.c. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
376 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 
32, 44 (1924)). 
377 299 u.s. 304 (1936). 
378 See, e.g., Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("Delegation of foreign affairs authority is given even broader deference than in the 
domestic arena. It is well settled that 'Congress-in giving the Executive authority over 
matters of foreign affairs-must of necessity paint with a brush broader than it customarily 
wields in domestic areas.'" (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965))); LOUIS HENKIN, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 124-25 (2d ed. 1996) ("If there 
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Some courts have gone so far as to assert that the nondelegation 
doctrine does not apply to this domain, because the President 
possesses independent constitutional authority to conduct foreign 
affairs.379 Further magnifying executive discretion, Congress has 
exempted foreign affairs functions from the APA's informal 
rulemaking procedures, allowing the Executive Branch to issue 
foreign affairs regulations outside the robust deliberative process 
afforded by public notice-and-comment procedures.380 As a result, 
many of the structural safeguards traditionally associated with 
administrative lawmaking simply do not apply to foreign affairs 
regulation. 381 
The due process model counsels a different approach. Applying 
due process, courts should read Curtiss-Wright narrowly382 to 
stand for the proposition that when administrative agencies 
exercise lawmaking powers vested in the President by Article II, 
ordinary structural constraints on congressional delegation do not 
apply. Congress may dispense with the substantive, procedural, 
and structural constraints associated with due process only when 
it directs the Executive Branch to employ lawmaking powers that 
the Constitution vests concurrently in both Congress and the 
President. Concurrent lawmaking powers include the regulation 
of diplomatic immunities383 and the administration of the armed 
remain some theoretical limitations on Congressional delegation ... in foreign affairs, no 
one has persuasively stated what they are and apparently no actual delegation by Congress 
has approached them."). 
379 See Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 318-19; United States v. Approximately 633.79 Tons of 
Yellowfin Tuna, 383 F. Supp. 659, 661 (S.D. Cal. 1974) (characterizing Curtiss- Wright as 
holding that "the separation of powers standard of delegation, applied to domestic affairs in 
Panama [Refining] and Schechter [Poultry], does not apply in the foreign affairs sphere"). 
But see generally G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of 
Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999) (critiquing Curtiss- Wright). 
380 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2006). 
381 See 1 TRIBE, supra note 111, at 634 (noting that the Court has allowed ''broad 
delegations of its foreign policy powers to the Executive Branch at times when it might not 
have permitted similarly expansive delegations with regards to domestic affairs"). 
382 See Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An 
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1973) (noting that "[n]o agreement on the 
meaning of [Curtiss-Wright] has emerged"). 
383 See In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 419 (1890) (holding that Article II, Section 2 confers 
power on the Executive Branch to recognize foreign diplomats). 
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forces. 384 Within such zones of overlapping constitutional powers, 
Congress can delegate broad lawmaking powers to the Executive 
Branch without undermining the checks and balances of Articles I 
and II. 
Curtiss-Wright should not be construed, however, to immunize 
all foreign affairs regulations from constitutional delegation 
review. The Constitution commits a variety of foreign affairs 
powers exclusively to Congress. These include the power to 
regulate foreign commerce,385 define offenses against the law of 
nations,386 and authorize appropriations for foreign assistance.387 
When Congress delegates lawmaking authority for these and other 
areas of exclusive congressional authority, it must satisfy the basic 
requirements of due process. 388 A host of cases decided before and 
after Curtiss- Wright confirm this understanding by applying 
ordinary delegation constraints to executive action in the realm of 
foreign commerce. 389 Although Congress may find it necessary to 
384 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (''The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States .... "); United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (Peters) 291, 301 
(1842) (''The power of the executive to establish rules and regulations for the government of 
the army is undoubted."). 
385 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659 
(4th Cir. 1953) ("[T]he power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is not among the 
powers incident to the Presidential office, but is expressly vested by the Constitution in the 
Congress."), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). 
386 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
387 ld. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see also HENKIN, supra note 378, at 89-90 (arguing that the 
President also "cannot unilaterally" declare war, regulate patents or copyrights, enact 
criminal laws to enforce treaty obligations, or enact general immigration laws); cf Medellin 
v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530-32 (2008) (holding that the President lacks a general 
constitutional "foreign affairs authority" to direct state courts to comply with a judgment of 
the International Court of Justice). 
388 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (explaining that if "'liberty' is to be 
regulated, it must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of the Congress . . . . And if that 
power is delegated, the standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests." 
(citing, inter alia, Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1936))). 
389 See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 7, 17 (1965) (reviewing an act giving the Executive 
the power to create travel controls); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 
394, 404, 409 (1928) (reviewing the delegation of the authority to fix customs duties); 
Marshal Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 690-91 (1892) (reviewing a delegation to the 
President to regulate "trade and commerce with other nations"); The Thomas Gibbons, 12 
U.S. (8 Cranch) 421, 428-29 (1814) (reviewing a delegation of power to regulate privateers 
during war); The Cargo of the Brig Aurora, Burn Side v. United States (The Brig Aurora), 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 382-83 (1813) (reviewing the President's proclamation making it 
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"paint with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic 
areas" in the complex arena of foreign affairs,390 this does not 
absolve Congress of its constitutional responsibility to establish an 
intelligible principle to guide agency discretion. 
When Congress delegates its exclusive foreign affairs powers, it 
also must ensure that executive lawmaking complies with 
procedural and structural due process.391 For example, to the 
extent that the APA currently exempts international trade 
regulation from ordinary deliberation requirements such as public 
notice and comment,392 Congress should address concerns about 
potential domination by either extending the APA's coverage or 
instituting comparable requirements of robust deliberation. 
Alternatively, courts should construe the APA's foreign affairs 
exceptions narrowly to apply only where APA-style procedures 
would be impracticable or contrary to the public interest because 
they would significantly compromise American foreign relations. 393 
The notion that agencies may dispense with ordinary rulemaking 
procedures merely because their actions related to a "foreign 
affairs function"-even if the impact on foreign relations would be 
relatively insignificant-is at odds with the due process modeJ.394 
In the dynamic and complex arena of foreign affairs, Congress still 
illegal to carry cargo imported from Britain); United States v. Dhafrr, 461 F.3d 211, 215 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (reviewing delegation of the authority to the President to promulgate criminal 
offenses regarding foreign affairs); Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1574, 
1576 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1984) (reviewing a delegation oflegislative authority to the President). 
aoo Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17. 
391 Cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power ouer International Law: Restoring the 
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 146 (2009) (questioning the constitutionality of federal statutes 
that authorize the Executive Branch to conclude international agreements without ex post 
congressional review). 
392 See generally William D. Araiza, Note, Notice-and-Comment Rights for Administrative 
Decisions Affecting International Trade: Heightened Need, No Response, 99 YALE L.J. 669 
(1989) (analyzing cases where courts held that international trade regulations fell under the 
APA's foreign affairs exception and therefore were immune from ordinary notice-and-
comment procedural requirements). 
393 Cf. Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F. 3d 427, 437 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the APP.:s foreign 
affairs exception applies where notice and comment would result in " 'definitely undesirable 
international consequences'" (quoting Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), 
superseded on other grounds by 8 U.S. C. § 1101(a)(42))). 
394 Mast Indus., 596 F. Supp. at 1583. 
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must ensure that administrative lawmaking satisfies the 
minimum requirements of due process. 
F. DELEGATING BEYOND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Although this Article has focused on congressional delegations 
within the federal government, it should be readily apparent that 
the due process model would have important implications for 
delegations to entities outside the federal government as well. For 
example, the Fifth Amendment arguably limits Congress's 
authority to entrust federal lawmaking power to state regulators, 
Native American tribes, private entities, and international 
organizations. In each of these contexts, Congress must establish 
safeguards to ensure that congressional delegation does not 
engender domination. While this Article does not afford the space 
for a detailed examination of the due process model's application to 
each of these contexts, a few preliminary observations may be in 
order. 
First, the due process model suggests that Congress must take 
care to narrow any delegations of its own exclusive lawmaking 
powers to state and tribal regulators. In a variety of fields, 
Congress possesses concurrent jurisdiction with states and 
tribes,395 meaning that state and tribal authorities may regulate 
freely to the extent permitted under federal law alongside 
Congress. Within these fields of concurrent jurisdiction, as in the 
foreign affairs context, Congress may entrust its lawmaking 
authority to subnational sovereigns without raising due process 
concerns because such delegations do not increase the delegate's 
capacity for domination. On the other hand, Congress may not 
delegate lawmaking powers in fields of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, such as immigration or national defense, without 
prescribing an intelligible principle to constrain its delegate's 
discretion, requiring the delegate to employ fair and deliberative 
395 See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign 
Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 150-52 (2001) (observing that federal and, 
state legislators possess concurrent powers in a variety of areas). 
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procedures, and ensuring that the delegate is accountable to the 
general public through federal supervision and judicial review.396 
Second, due process principles should be understood to govern 
congressional delegation to private entities. In the past, federal 
courts have held that the Due Process Clause requires Congress to 
establish a substantive standard to guide the development of legal 
standards by private parties.397 The due process model also 
suggests that Congress may not authorize private entities to wield 
public lawmaking powers outside the constraints of fair and 
deliberative procedures.398 Private entities entrusted with 
congressionally delegated lawmaking powers also must be subject 
to the effective control of public officials, and their actions must be 
subject to judicial review to ensure that delegation from the public 
sphere to the private sphere does not engender domination.399 
Third, the due process model offers a new approach for 
evaluating the constitutionality of so-called "international 
396 See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1975) (conducting due 
process review of a federal statute that expanded a tribe's jurisdiction to regulate activities 
of non-members outside tribal territory). 
397 Compare Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) 
(recognizing "that Congress is not barred from acting pursuant to its powers under Article I 
to vest decisionmaking authority in tribunals that lack the attributes of Article III courts" 
and may empower agency actions that "affect private interests"), with Washington ex rel. 
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1928) (invalidating an ordinance 
that imposed no substantive standard to guide the superintendant in issuing building 
permits, leaving the superintendent to act capriciously and arbitrarily), and Gen. Elec. Co. 
v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1458-59 (2d Cir. 1991) (remanding the case to 
the trial court to ascertain whether the states procedure in setting wage rates based on 
private party agreements was guided by a substantive standard or was bargained for 
collusively). Courts also have criticized delegations to private parties generally, to the 
extent that they make federal regulation "subservient to selfish or arbitrary motivations or 
the whims oflocal taste." Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 666 
(4th Cir. 1989). 
398 Cf Gen. Elec. Co., 936 F.2d at 1458-59 (holding that a state's pro forma adoption of 
wage rates, drawn from collusively negotiated collective bargaining agreements, would 
constitute "an unconstitutional delegation of authority" and granting discovery regarding 
"the actual procedure the state followed"). 
399 See supra note 288 and accompanying text; Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1470-73 (2003) ("[d]etermining when private 
delegations are adequately structured to ensure constitutional accountability" and 
examining the dangers when this structure does not exist); see also Jody Freeman, The 
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 663--73 (2000) (examining the 
implications of public and private independence). 
HeinOnline  -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 207 2011-2012
2011] WHEN DELEGATION BEGETS DOMINATION 207 
delegations," including delegations of lawmaking authority to 
international organizations.40° During the past decade, a growing 
body of academic commentary has debated whether--or under 
what conditions-international delegations violate the 
nondelegation doctrine.40l In one recent case, Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. EPA,402 the D.C. Circuit suggested 
parenthetically that there was a "serious likelihood" that a treaty 
entrusting standard-setting authority to member-state 
representatives would not pass muster under the nondelegation 
doctrine.4o3 The due process model advanced in this Article 
buttresses this idea that treaty-based delegations are subject to 
constitutional constraints, but it offers a more-fine-grained 
constitutional framework for evaluating whether particular treaty-
based delegations are constitutional. Whenever the President and 
Senate jointly commit lawmaking authority to international or 
regional institutions, they must ensure that those institutions are 
subject to safeguards-such as an intelligible substantive 
standard, fair and deliberative procedures, political accountability, 
and judicial review-to ensure that federal delegation does not 
beget domination.404 
400 The term "international delegation" has been defined broadly to embrace adjudicatory, 
executive, and lawmaking functions. See Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept 
of International Delegation, 71 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 10-17 (2008) (detailing the types 
of delegated authority, such as legislative delegation, adjudicative delegation, monitoring 
and enforcement delegation, regulatory delegation, agenda setting, research and advice, 
policy implementation, and redelegation). 
401 Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-
Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Kristina Daugirdas, International Delegations 
and Administrative Law, 66 MD. L. REV. 707 (2007); David Golove, The New Confederalism: 
Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697 
(2003); Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 1693 (2008); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International 
Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); John 0. 
McGinnis, Medellin and the Future of International Delegation, 118 YALE L.J. 1712 (2009). 
402 464 F.3d 1 (2006). 
403 Id. at 9 (quoting Almandarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998)). 
404 Cf Jensen v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 512 F.2d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding 
that federal courts may not review regulations promulgated by the International Pacific 
Halibut Commission and subsequently approved by the Secretary of State pursuant to a 
putatively standardless treaty delegation). 
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Applying due process to international delegations obviously 
raises a host of complex questions regarding the relationship 
between the national and international legal orders, which are 
beyond the scope of this Article. At a minimum, however, the due 
process model suggests that an exclusive focus on whether 
international delegations contain an intelligible principle405 is 
inadequate because substantive standards alone do not guarantee 
that international delegations will not beget domination. Future 
debates about the constitutional validity of international 
delegations should therefore devote greater attention to procedural 
and structural safeguards. 
G. CASE STUDY: INTERNATIONAL TEXTILE REGULATION 
A brief case study from the realm of international textile 
regulation illustrates the due process model's potential to inform 
judicial review of congressional delegations. In section 204 of the 
Agriculture Act of 1956, Congress authorized the President to 
negotiate agreements with foreign states to limit international 
trade in textile products "whenever he determines such action 
appropriate."406 Upon concluding such agreements, the President 
was charged with issuing "regulations governing the entry or 
withdrawal from warehouse of any such commodity, product, 
textiles, or textile products to carry out any such agreement."407 
President Richard Nixon eventually subdelegated these duties to 
an inter-agency advisory panel: the Committee for the 
Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA).4os 
During the 1980s, a trade association comprised of 
manufacturers of domestic textile and apparel products brought an 
action in the U.S. Court of International Trade seeking declaratory 
405 See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) 
(evaluating delegation under traditional doctrine). 
4os 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982). 
407 Jd. 
40B Exec. Order No. 11,651, 37 Fed. Reg. 4699 (1972), reprinted as amended in 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1854 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). CITA consists of representatives from the Departments of 
State, Treasury, Commerce, and Labor, with the U.S. Trade Representative or a designee 
participating as a nonvoting member. Id. 
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and injunctive relief from a CITA regulation that quantitatively 
restricted the import of certain Chinese textiles pursuant to a 
multilateral trade agreement.409 The trade association argued 
that CITA's import restriction was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of administrative discretion, contrary to statute and the 
Constitution, and therefore void."410 The Court of International 
Trade rejected those arguments, however, holding that Congress's 
delegation did not violate the nondelegation doctrine because it fell 
within the domain of foreign affairs.411 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit in American Ass'n of Exporters 
and Importers-Textile and Apparel Group v. United States 
(AAEI-TAG) upheld CITA's import restriction as a valid exercise 
of delegated lawmaking authority.412 The court acknowledged that 
the Foreign Commerce Clause vested authority to regulate 
international trade exclusively in Congress and that the Executive 
Branch accordingly lacked such authority absent a valid 
delegation.413 The court also conceded that the Act did not place 
any substantive or procedural restrictions on the Executive 
Branch's administration of the textile trade program.414 
Nonetheless, the court declined to invalidate the import restriction 
on constitutional or statutory grounds. First, the court found "no 
basis, either within [the delegating statute] itself, the overall 
statutory scheme, or the legislative history, to add more to the 
statute than meets the eye."415 Second, it declined to consider 
whether CITA's finding that a "market disruption" justified 
409 Am. Ass'n of Exps. & lmps.-Textile & Apparel Grp. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 
591, 591-94 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). 
41° Id. at 595. 
411 Id. at 598. The court also rejected the plaintiffs contention that the executive action 
exceeded the scope of delegated authority under the Agricultural Act of 1956 and other 
federal legislation. Id. at 594, 598--99. 
412 751 F.2d 1239, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
413 Id. at 1247. But see United States v. Approximately 633.79 Tons of Yellowfin Tuna, 
383 F. Supp. 659, 661-62 (S.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that "when considering a delegation of 
authority to engage in international negotiations, only the most clear abuse or true 
congressional abdication or a violation of individual constitutional rights should lead to the 
invalidation of the legislation by the courts"). 
414 AAEI-TAG, 751 F.2d at 1247. 
mId. 
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restricting Chinese textile imports was "arbitrary and capricious," 
concluding that this factual finding was unreviewable.416 Third, it 
held that CITA's import restriction was exempt from notice and 
comment under the APA's foreign affairs exception because "prior 
announcement of CITA's intention to impose stricter quotas" 
would create "an incentive for foreign interests and American 
importers to increase artificially the amount of trade in textiles 
prior to a final administrative determination."417 Lastly, it 
rejected the trade association's argument that the delegating 
statute violated its members' due process rights, reasoning that 
the Due Process Clause did not apply because the trade 
association could assert no "legitimate claim of entitlement" to 
trade in Chinese textiles that would qualify as property for due 
process protection, only a mere "unilateral expectation" of future 
commerce.418 
In contrast, had the Federal Circuit applied the due process 
model, both its mode of analysis and the outcome of the case could 
have taken a radically different turn. The due process model 
affirms that Congress may not delegate its constitutional power 
over foreign commerce to the Executive Branch without first 
establishing an intelligible principle to guide executive discretion. 
No such principle appears in the delegating statute here by the 
court's own admission.419 The fact that CITA apparently limited 
its own discretion by installing an intelligible principle in a 
subsequent multilateral trade agreement-the market disruption 
requirement-did not adequately safeguard liberty for the reasons 
set forth in American Trucking: the selection of this standard was 
itself an exercise in substantively unfettered discretion.420 Had 
Congress established a suitable intelligible principle, the 
deferential arbitrary-and-capricious review standard would have 
been appropriate under the due process model to ensure that CITA 
416 Id. at 1248. 
417 Id. at 1249. 
418 Id. at 1250. 
419 Id. at 1247. In many contexts where Congress has authorized the Executive Branch to 
enter into international regulatory agreements, Congress has specified intelligible 
principles. Hathaway, supra note 391, at 159-64. 
420 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001). 
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acted in reasonable compliance with Congress's chosen standard. 
Although CITA made a strong showing in AAEI-TAG that there 
was good cause-i.e., the threat of preemptive countermeasures by 
other states-to set aside the APA's ordinary notice-and-comment 
procedures,421 this alone did not relieve CITA of its constitutional 
due process obligation to craft trade restrictions through fair and 
deliberative procedures, such as interim final rulemaking. The 
due process model also challenges the circuit court's conclusion 
that the trade association in AAEI-TAG lacked an interest 
protected by due process. Under the due process model, CITA's 
restriction on Chinese textile imports clearly impacted the trade 
association's constitutionally protected liberty interests in freedom 
of contract, triggering the substantive, procedural, and structural 
safeguards of due process.422 In each of these respects, the due 
process model furnishes a practical framework that could 
transform how federal courts review congressional delegations like 
the one at issue inAAEI-TAG. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that federal courts should abandon the 
traditional nondelegation doctrine and embrace due process as the 
primary constitutional constraint on congressional delegation. 
According to the due process model, Congress may delegate 
lawmaking authority to administrative agencies if it channels that 
authority through substantive, procedural, and structural 
safeguards that prevent delegation from manifestly increasing the 
federal government's capacity for arbitrary lawmaking, the 
principal republican concern driving traditional nondelegation 
principles. Congressional delegations meet this standard when 
they combine (1) an intelligible principle to guide agency discretion 
together with (2) deliberative procedural requirements and (3) 
structural constraints, such as political accountability and judicial 
review. In most contexts, the APA easily satisfies procedural due 
process, avoiding the· need for further judicial intrusion into 
421 AAEI-TAG, 751 F.2d at 1247. 
422 See supra notes 317-21 and accompanying text. 
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administrative rulemaking procedure. Where an agency's 
lawmaking procedures do not satisfy the constitutional 
requirements of due process, however, courts should withhold 
Chevron deference and, where appropriate, set aside regulations to 
safeguard the public from administrative domination. The due 
process model thus takes seriously the nondelegation doctrine's 
republican ideals while reframing the Court's current delegation 
jurisprudence to better reconcile congressional delegation in the 
modern administrative state with the Constitution's enduring 
commitment to individual liberty. 
